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A B S T R A C T 
The primary goal of this thesis is to analyse the 
relationship of psychology to existentialism. 
Part One presents the historical derivation of the 
existential viewpoint as well as a discussion of the 
various differences between essentialism and 
existentialism. 
This is followed by an examination of the 
relationship of scientific psychology - here depicted as 
a pursuit akin to the natural sciences - to 
existentialism. The latter is seen as calling for a 
science of humans. That is, one baaed on (a) a 
recognition of the unique features of human beings; and 
(b) the assumption that unless these features are 
included in accounts of human action such accounts 
suffer loss of intelligibility. 
Chapter Three is taken up with an examination of 
the notions of anxiety and freedom, by way of 
demonstrating the existential method of apprehending 
various psychological categories. 
The existentialist approach to psychotherapy is 
then examined, as are some of the implications for 
therapists of maintaining an existential orientation. 
1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Various writers (Shotter, 1975; Westland, 1978; 
Koch 9 1964; and Boring_ 1963) have commented on the 
divisivane • a within psychology created by differing 
opinion• a • to (a) What can reasonably be included 
within psychology 9 a subject matter; (b) the validity of 
various model • of humanity used to elucidate human 
behaviour; and (c) What the aims, if any, of psychology 
The behaviourist school stresses prediction and 
control as research methods that yield significant 
results. And in the case of Skinner® for example 9 as a 
type of social ethic which may bring some order to the 
world in a dangerous age. ("Beyond Freedom and Dignity", 
"Walden II".) Freud sought to make clear the role of 
biology in human behaviour. The group of people 
blanketed by the term• "Humanistic or Third Force 
Psychology" are basically concerned with establishing 
what may be called a human • ci • nce.• Thia science ia 
based on the aa • umption that the characteristics 
posaea• ed by huaana are uniqu • to them and that failure 
to take these characteri• tic • into account produces 
less than satisfactory or even trivial reaulta. The 
exiatantialiats in particular have undertaken a 
searching examination of what it means to be human, and 
from this analysis have concluded that thare i • a great 
deal to be gained from releasing p• ychology from the 
2 
Existentialist critiques of positivist psychology 
generally 
ignores 




supposedly unique human characteristics, and therefore 
produce results that are not intelligible from a human 
perspective. Furthermore, there is the implication that 
the tenor of such research reduces the status of humans 
to that of any other manipulable object. 
The rejoinder from those psychologists who are 
committed to the natural science mode of investigation 
is that existentialism (or any other facet of the Third 
Force movement, so called) is an obfuacating anthropo-
centric philosophy which is openly subjective and there 
fore antagonistic to the objective ideal upheld by 
science. Existential assertions concerning the 
fundamental nature of the human condition cannot be 
empirically tested, and therefore, whatever their 
philosophical appeal, are of no use to science, which 
sets certain standards of methodology and epistemology 
in its search for truth~ 
It will be the initial task of this work to 
establish what is meant by the term "existential", by an 
examination of the historical development of various 
ideas and concepts regarding the apprehension of 
reality. Following this is an historical overview of 




The examination of 







present, mainly positivist influence in psychology, has 
a number of shortcomings of both a scientific and 
The theoretical ability of positivist ethical nature. 
psychology to predict and control human behaviour is 
behaviourist also questioned, since shortcomings in 
programmes are often attributed to insufficient data and 
background knowledge, and not to the possibility that 
the belief in the deterministic nature of behaviour may 
be incorrect. Furthermore the ability of natural science 
methods to come to grips and provide reasonably 
intelligible answers to the various aspects of human 
behaviour is questioned. A human science is suggested as 
an alternativeo The role of existentialism in such a 
science becomes apparent, since it seeks to provide an 
analysis of what it is to be human. 
It is not suggested that a human science is in some 
way superior to the natural sciences. What is suggested 
is that because of the nature of humans, which will be 
discussed, the methods of the hard sciences are 
conceptually unequipped to deal with reality at the 
self-conscious level. The concepts of freedom and 
anxiety as they are seen from the existential viewpoint 
are explicated to demonstrate the unique 
existential investigation and understanding 
met.hod of 
of human 
reality - a reality which is dominated by the mode known 
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as Eigenwelt, that ist that of the subjective 11 Iu. The 
existential method of apprehending human reality is 




existentialism is a 
mer ya certain style of 
world-view,a 
apprehending 
reality is of minor importance9 It is apparent, however 9 
that it contains certain explicit and implicit values, 
by virtue of the assertions it makes about human 
nature, and what is considered to be a desirable mode of 
existence. This ethical content is examined, as are some 





ll I S T O R I C A L O V E R V I E W 
Due to its popularisation through the works of 
Sartre, Camus, Beckett and others, existentialism became 
somewhat of a fad in the post World War Two years. A 
lack of acquaintance with the influences and origins of 
the works of these writers has led some critics of 
existentialism to suppose that their world-view is 
simply derivative of a pessimism springing from their 
placement in an era that had known two world wars, 
global economic collapse, revolutions made and betrayed. 
It is not to be denied that years of occupatiou and the 
threat of a nuclear showdown between the victors 
provided conditions conducive to an existential mode of 
questioning, such that one is led to ask, for example, 
what does it mean for me, as an individual, to exist, 
especially in the knowledge that my existence is 
precarious, and its end is certain? War and revolution, 
however, are only exaggerations of the conditions under 
which we live in normal times, which most of us are 
prone to 
them the 
forget for various reasons, not least among 
visl1 to maintain at least the illusion of 
6 
security. Therefore, to eee existentialism as solely an 
aberrant vorld-~iev formed under stressful conditions is 
erroneous, and misses the points which existentialists 
wish to make about our existence as self-aware beings@ 
The concern here is wtth being, therefore we begin with 
the Greeks, asking what does it mean to exist, to be? 
Parmenides maintained that being was identical 
with what can be thought, that is, with essence and 
meaning., "'I'hou canst not know what is not - that is 
impossible - nor utter it; for it ie the same thing that 
can be thought and that can be." (1) Hence only those 
entitiies that are intelligible or rational can be said 
to exist. The obvious problem here is one of appearance. 
Some things only appear to be, but obviously they must 
appear to be something. This introduces the problem of 
existence versus essence. Parmenides places reality in 
the essence of things (that is, those things that can be 
named - "what is a pencil?" It is a cylindrical piece of 
wood with a filament of graphite and clay.), yet is 
aware that there is at least an appearance of individual 
existence. How are these two to be related, if reality 
can be identified only with one, namely essence 7 
Plato upheld Parmenidee' position, that being is a 
matter of what is (reality) and what merely appears to 
be (appearance). Reality is identical with essences. 
Plato developed the notion of essences as ideas - pure 
thought. This is the highest reality. For example, in 
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the essential world one may have the idea of the perfect 
circle. In the existent world, the world we encounter, 
such an entity does not exist. That such imperfection is 
to be found was evidence for Plato that the existential 
world, that world outside ideas, was not truly real. He 
did grant this world a limited reality however, sed on 
its (i rfect) relationship to the world of ideas. 
Furthermore it is only possible to conceive of the 
existential world because the world of ideas. This, 
as Blocker (1979) points out, renders the material world 
gratuitous. An abyss opens up, separating essence 
existence 
Aristotle, in an attempt to hold the middle ground, 
posited that real being was a synthesis of essence and 
existence an amalgam of the formal ideas of Plato and 
the world of encountered material. sought Plato's 
ssences in material existence, and attempted to ground 
r ality in e ticular information acquired hrough 
our senses. 
Aristotle's synthesis was not entirely successful, 
and in his elucidation of the question of b ng he 
shi s to an emphasis on Plato's essences. Russell 
quotes ller in this matter: "The 'forms' had for him, 
as the 'ideas' had for Plato, a metaphysical existence 
of their own, as conditioning all individual things. And 
keenly as he followed the growth of ideas out of 
experience 9 it is nonetheless true that these ideas, 
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especially at the point where they are furthest removed 
from experience and immediate perception, are 
metamorphosed in the end from a logical product of human 
thought into an immediate presentment of a super-
sensible world, and the object in that sense, of an 
intellectual intuition.Ii (2) 
The factors which drive Aristotle to this position 
are particularly important to the whole matter of the 
philosophical analysis of the question of existence. And 
it is worthwhile to note the comments of Blocker: II ••• 
essence is all that can be known, thought, or spoken of 
anything. We remain convinced, instinctively, that there 
is something else, variously called matter, existence, 
substratum, which thoughts are about and essences are 
of, but we can't say or think what it is, for as soon as 
we do what we say becomes an essence." (3) 
What then can be said of existence other than that 
11 it is 11 ? By definition, what is stated is an essence, 
that is, a universal~ abstract attribute. It would 
appear then, that the communication of an existential 
reality is not possible by the languages of philosophy 
or science, or perhaps any language. Existentialism is 
often attacked for its lack of scientific precision 
(Koch, 1964, for example). Strictly speaking, these 
above are the reasons. The articulation of a thing's 
attributes, its essences, does not define its existence. 
This has ramifications for the role of existentialism in 
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psychology. The explication of an individual's beha-
viour, dispositions, tendencies and the like can never 
exhaust the possibilities of that individual. Even ter 
all the data are in, one could still not say exactly 
what the individual is.* 
The extreme development of the essentialist 
position results in idealism, which holds that r 
knowl ge resides only in thoughts and ideas. to•e 
ideas, when internalised must result in a subjectivism 
li ley's. This overcomes the problem of duality 
since there exists no tension between my thoughts of 
reality and what reality actually is • 
The problems of modern philosophy and psychology, 
however, inhere mainly from a realist philosophy which 
uses the same categories as Parmenides the Gr , but 
with a reverse of emp sis. The realist assumes a real 
world "out there'' as well as an essential world of i as 
and sensations of what is out t e. This essential 
world constitutes our linguistic or psychological world 
of meaning •• We are left with a dualism and t problem 
of how to relate the two sides of the equation, essence 
and existence. Descartes' attempt to establish 
philosophy and science on immoveable foundations led him 
* his is not merely the assertion that t definition 
of existence is arbitrary. What is meant here is that 
the method of natural science, relying as it does on the 
elucidation of essences, cannot hope to provide a full 
or final account of man 
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to a dualism (mainly because he wished to save people 
from a mechanistic reduction), that has resisted all 
formal attempts at unification. The problems inherent in 
a dualistic position stem from the above-mentioned 
attempt to establish a relation between what we think 
the world is, and what it actually is. Over the 
centuries, as various nkers began to realise that we 
apprehend the world via t ia of our senses, ey 
were driven to conclude (no doubt on the basis that our 
senses can at times be misleading) that our 
understanding of the world may be faulty or deficient 
due to the imperfection of the senses. This also assumes 
a clear demarcation between the experiencer and what is 
experienced. 
Locke and Kant, among others, posit a reality which 
completely transcends our conceptual understanding. 
Knowledg of this reality is of dubious validity, sine,~ 
e ssential concepts. The fore, how can 
we know if ideas resemble their putative external 
causes, and if they do, how systematic is this 
resemblance, and how is it achieved ? 
Both Locke and Kant admit that nothing o er than 
that 11 it. is 11 can be said of this independent reality. 
are driv n back to the same conclusion. The very attempt 
to speak, even to think, discursively, of existence, 
reduces it to essence. This is perhaps sometimes 
intuitivley apparent in the inability to express oneself 
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in words alone. A storyteller, poet or artist, if they 
are to speak to our existence, must be able to invoke 
not only an intellectual appreciation, but vhat is 
usually called a feeling. Hany of tl1e existential 





Blocker points out " ••• [the 
seem to ee that ile 
existence cannot be logically articulated, it can be 
artistically evoked." (4) This has lications for the 
role, if any, that existentialism 1oay play in psychology 
and psychotherapy. As far as experimental psychology is 
concerned, t usefulness of concepts which cannot be 
logically stated would seem to be rather limited, to 
understate the case. In psychotherapy, however, the 
assertion that one cannot logically articulate existence 
seems to find its mark in therap utic techniques such as 
role playi , play therapy, and the like. 
Philoso y, post-Ari totle, tends to divide itself 
into idealism versus realism, with the latter adopting a 
distinct dualism that differentiates meaningful being 
(essence) and an existence which is "independent of 
meaning and human consciousness." (5) istence is 
filtered by us into essences, and the link between them 
is not understood. Idealists do not assume, for what 
seem pragmatic reasons, an independent reality, and 
therefore reality is a matter of essences. Blocker goes 
to some lengths to explain the realist/idealist debate 
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which develops soi:1ewha t in the following wa_y. For an 
idealist to say that a thi11g is, it must be conceptually 
meaningful (being is rueaniog) - it must be knowable in 
t e n1 i::; of 1 o g i ca 1 t. lrn ugh t • If not , then i t is nothing • 
Fur a realist, nothing, as well as being a function of 
meaninglcssnessD also indicates the category of 
transcendent reality (like Locke and Kant) which is 
assumed to exist essences are of), but which 
cannot be spoken of as it is.* "Thus leaving aside non-
being ••• realists arimit two ontological categories: 
reality (existence) and meaningful being (essence), 
whereas the idealists allow only one, meaningful being. 
Hence the clash of essence and existence only occurs 
within realism, and does not appear in idealism." (6) 
This leads to the observation that even some 
writers who are called existentialists are, in the 
technical sense® idealists. liere is an early indication 
that existentialism is not a systeriJ of philosophy in the 
usual sense. Heidegger, while he adreases existential 
* "~othing" for the realist does not indicate merely a 
void, but also a lack, on our part, of an ability to 
directly apprehend reality. uNothing" is the inability 
to grasp existence other than through our sensory and 
conceptual apparatus. This problem is found in Sartre's 
accou.nt of consciousness and its relation to the 
existent world. [See below]. 
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themes is, at least early on, an idealist. fl For 
Hetdegger and Husserl there is no contrast between 
meaningful being and reality, but only between meaning 
which is being, and non-meaning, which is nothing. Hence 
they understand being exclusively in terms of essence. 
Either we have an understandable something or we have 
nothing. There is no sense of an independently existing, 
transcendent, but ble reality "out there", prior 
to understanding." (7) 
Two points re noteworthy here: (1) It is important 
to distinguisl1 between the essential and existential 
modes of thought relevant to the realist orientation, 
and to be aware that the tendency s been to assert the 
essential, conceptual side of the duality, for the very 
good reason that rational, logical, scientific language 
is inappropriate, in the strict sense, to an 
investigation of existence; (2) Within the 
tradition of existential writing~ there are individuals 
whose assump ions place them outsid the realist camp, 
and therefore they cannot be said to be writing from an 
essentialist versus existentialist perspective. They 
adress the question of being. However to characterise 
them as filling the side of the equation which is anti-
S ,. 1· e ·· t· 1' f 11··. c an(" • - u .. - r ·- . ! ., anti-rational, is obviously quite 
mistaken. The historically formed differences over the 
characterisat-ion of reality have been briefly stated. 
Although some existenU.alist writers may be 
philosophic.ally inclined to a realist position, and 
therefore to investigate 
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reality in terms of a dualism, one side of which is 
termed existence, existentialism per se need not necess-
itate such a dualist position. In fact a good deal of 
the existential work has sought to undercut the subject 
/object dichotomy. a~icutifi~ cudcavuu1 is often 
characterised as a searcl1 for objectivity. It now seems 
likely that such objectivity is a useful fiction, but no 
more then that. Existentialism is often thought of as 
subjectivist. However, if objectivity is no more than a 
fiction, subjectivity can be no more than thiR either, 
since they are dependant categories. It remains to be 
seen however, if existential concepts can be stated in 
such a way that would leave them open to scientific 
investigation. These notions will be examined in 
Chapters III and IV. 
K I E R K E G A A R D 
resurgence themes in the modern 
era is generally attributed to the works of the Danish 
theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, who espoused a mode of 
existential thought and existence in reaction to what he 
saw as the overly abstract philosophical edifice created 
by llegel, and the stagnation of religious life, in a 
country e everyone was a Christian by definition, 
but not by action0 One stens to add, however, that it 
was not a concern with religion per se which made 
15 
Kier gaard the founder of existentialism, but rather 
his treatment of this matter " ••• this does not mean 
that all existentialists deliberateley derived all or 
any part of their thought from Kierkegaard, but that he 
first manifested the tendencies which are the mark of 
existentialisrn. 11 (B) One such tendency, according to 
rnock is " ••• the recognition that each pe son, in his 
own individual existence, must receive and understand a 
purely personal and subjective truth just as the 
individual has his own passions and his own life to 
live, so he has his own truths.n (9) From these comments 
of Warnock's can be seen the oft-mentioned emphasis 
which the existentialists place on individual truth. 
This subjectivism is often a point of departure for 
criticisms of existentialism as being overly introverted 
and solipsistic. In his call for a subjective rendering 
of truth 1 however, Kierkegaard is in no way attempting 
to deny the validity of the essentialist approach; but 
in regard to human existence he is quite emphatic. 
11 
••• mo<lern philosophy has fogotten what it means to be a 
human being. Not what it means to be a human being in 
general [i.e., an essential approach] •••• but what it 
means that you and I and he are human beings, each one 
c 1 • 'if" II (1('') r or ,11. rn s e .1. : • J 
The themes of e istentialist writers 
directly from Kierkegaard's emphasis on the 
derive 
ct that, 
for an individual human, it is the very fact of the 
16 
recognition of his or her own existence, not only as 
part of some generalised group, race etc., and the 
consequences nf this recognition, which can markedly 
alter one's orientation to More 
precisely, this recognition is fundamental to a person's 
"proper" existence. Johnson maintains that the ethical 
imperative inherent in Kierkegaard's existentialism is 
this: "Become what you are". To do this one must first 
of all come to r cognise and comprehend the basic 
attributes of human existence. These givens include 
such things as our own finitude, the fact that we and 
things are subject to change, that we have limited time 
and limited capacities and abilities both physically and 
mentally. How thes universals* of existence apply to 
"me as tl1e individual" constitute e istential questions. 
As far as can be seen, Kierkegaard end the other 
e istentialists do not seek to answ questions 
concerning 11 the meaning of in general, or n1ine in 
particular. Rather, they emphasise that it is part of 
the human condition, to ask such questions. It is only 
* These universals are derived from an ontological 
analysis of the human condition. Although they appear to 
be ubiquitous, it cannot be denied that they are the 
product of human thought and therefore are as subject to 
error as other such products. 
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in the context of an individually lived existence that 
answers can be f orthcondng. Even then 9 they will only be 
true fort t individual. These answers, Kierkegaard 
would hold, can only hav validity when they are formed 
in the light of the above-mentioned givens of existence. 
One could not, supposedly be said to be living an 
au ntic existence if on did not r co se that one's 
existence could be suddenly, and without sign or 
warning, ended, since this is a condition under which we 
certainly do live. 
Kierkegaard, however, 1.s not advocating a totally 
subjectivist position, and it is well to be aware of 
hat he means by subj ctive: "thought which evolves 
around the subject in his indivuality, hut is not 
securely anchored in the universally human will result 
in aberrant inwardness madness. Subjective thought, 
cowbining as it does the individual and the universal is 
th n a mean between total obj ctivity and pu ely 
idiosyncratic reflection. 11 (11)* 
It seems li ly that Kierkegaard wished to overcome 
an absolute obj ct/subject dichotomy but was somewhat 
* his does not imply the imposition of personalism on 
reality. Part of this subjectivity i the knowledge that 
the individual does not constitute the world. On the 
contrary, the interrelationships of people, individuals 
and things must be reckoned with. 
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bound by the terminology and prevailing philosophy of 
his time, which was heavily :i.nfluenci~d by the dualism of 
Descartes and th transcendental idealism of Kant. What 
Kierkegaard appears to imply by subjectivity is a type 
of The individual is 
the fin 1 arbiter on 11 points relating to his or her 
ist nc • 
As the first of the modern existentialists 
Kierkegaard runs a course between total objectivity: the 
derivation of values and concepts from outside oneself 
which one then puts on like clothes, and at the other 
ext eme, what he see as the mark of insanity: namely 
the total rejection of existent reality. On the 
contrast, as he perceived it, between subjective and 
objective knowledge, Kierkegaard stated "When the 
question of truth is stated in an objective manner, 
reflection is dir cted objectively to the truth, as an 
object to hich the knower is related. Reflection is not 
fucuaacd on the relationship, however, but on the 
question whether it is the truth to which the knower is 
related. If only the object to which he is related is 
the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. 
When the question of truth is raised subjectively, 
reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the 
individual's relationship; if only the mode of this 
relationship is in the truth the individual is in truth 
even if he should happen to be thus related to what is 
19 
not true •••• When subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, 
the truth becomes objectively a paradox; and the fact 
that the truth is objectively a paradox shows in its 
turn that subjectivity is the truth. For the objective 
situation (of entertaining a paradoxical thought) is 
r pellant: 1 an<l the expression for the objective 
repulsion constitutes the tension and the measure of the 
corresponding inwardness. The paradoxical nature of the 
truth is its objective uncertainty; this uncertainty is 
the e pression for the pas ionate inwardness and this 
passion is pr cisely the truth" (12) 
It is not intended that we examine the various 
notions of truth her • Suffice to say however that 
Kierkeeaard's concepts of truth would r ceive little 
support from the scientific community. Obviously he is 
speaking of a differ nt kind of truth, which may be 
id ntical with obj ctive truth, so-called, but not 
nee ss rily. ther this truth is a typ of ethical 
truth. 
Kierkegaard claims that for an individual mindful of 
what it means to be human (i.e. 9 aware of human 
dimensions of existence; namely, finitude, uncertainty, 
n de ree of dete mination of being etc), subjectivity is 
the way to proceed to the truth regarding his or her own 
existence. Objective ( -~~ttght)is focussed on something 
outside of the individual and therefore only comes to 
him or her secondhand, via concepts and abstractions. 
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This is indicative of Kierkegaard's unstated dualist 
orientation. Ue makes no attempt to unify human 
existence, and the human inventions of concepts by which 
we speak of this existence. Like Descartes, Kierkegaard 
realises that the principal existential statement of 
fact is "It is" or "I am". Beyond that, nothing of 
certainty can be said. Kie d does not attempt to 
deny the validity of scientific or philosophical truths, 
but claims that they do not pertain to the individual 
existent. He appears to be saying that there are any 
number of truths, the validity of which can only be 
judged from the observer's standpoint. If one is given 
to looking for final truths or all-encompassing systems 
it becomes apparent that there is a disparity between 
the individual who claims he experiences himself as a 
free agent capable of intentional acts, and a 
philosophical and scientific traditio11 th t proposes, 
with its own good ev:i.dential reasons, that th way we 
say we are, and the way science says we arej do not 
match up. The situation can be stated in a number of 
ways: (1) Is this basically an issue as to what 
constitutes valid truth, i.e. , scientific versus 
personal knowledge? This would often seem to be the 
case when the proponents of one school assert their 
position by calling into doubt the claims of the other, 
and pointing out its shortcomings. 
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(2) Is it possible to etlopt the position where 
one maintains a degree of existential freedom but 
recognises that one the focus of forct?S and 
influences over which one has little control or no 
control at all ? This is ierkegaard's and 
}I idegger 1 s position. Sartre would at fir t assume an 
un ttered human c pability for freedom of choice and 
ction. 
Inherent in this is the question of tis to be 
taken the nature of action in the world science 
g nerally a um a causative role, and dos not admit 
to any sot of (eg) teleological principle • Psychology 
in tl1e twentieth century has mad the issue even more 
tuq~id ( -i ro··,-i <·· ,,, -L ·i y ...!.. l.1 -~ ,,. ;;,.- ~ -.~ enough by its attempts to simplify 
by atteMpting to do away with the notion of 
consciousness. Self-awareness is a l1uman attribute.* Its 
role in initiatin or ca sing action, \-Ihet:ht!r it is 
it elf aused i th sens of bing formed by antec dent 
ev nts 1 is unknown. The inability to come to grips with 
tli se p obl s would se,om to indicate a deficiency in 
* t is not intend d to enter into a discussion 
r garding the di.ff rence between consciousness and self-
consciousness. Hhether and to what degree animals 
possess consciousness in terms of an ability to self-
reflect or to form some sort of self-identity is an 
important question, but one which is beyond the scope of 
this work. 
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the way the problems ar cone ptuali d - as urn.ing they 
are capable of being adequately conceptualised. Science 
presents mechania1ns toe plain how A is said to cause B. 
Consciousness is thus ncaused 11 by the a tion of neurons 
and electric 1 and material rn ssag sin the materialist 
conception. The leap from a pur ly physical analysis to 
our experi nee of consciousness ppears to be a vast 
one. The ability to objectify may be a sourc of the 
problem. It cannot be seen how cons iousness could be 
ident:ifiable with the actiou of neurons, bee use such 
concepts have be n obj ctivized made remote from human 
beings. The remoteness of such ideas from the way humans 
generally experience themselves gives them Lt1otionally 
negative content which make th rn unacceptabl to many 
p e o p 1 e who s e e i n t h m a d i mi n i s h c1 en t o f t he i r human i t y , 
a reduction to mat rialism. 
Ki rkega r<I v,a n o t o 1,1 u c h i n t r t d i. n hese 
matters, though they are rel vant to hi position, as he 
was with xplicoting a wholly human reality.* This 
reality cannot be conceptualised and examined from a 
natural science perspective. Such a perspective is 
found to be 1 eking bee use it does not deal with 
matters that are sp cifically human (self-awareness 
* y this is meant the significance of the subjective 
mode of xperience and all that it entails. 
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and its consequences), nor can it, since its method 
1. ir: JJ 1 :Les o ti j e ct iv is a ti on I in Kier e g a a rd I s view • 
N I E T Z S C H E 
The inclusion of l'!ietz ch in an historical survey 
that also includes Kierkegaard serves o illustrate that 
the existential tradition is not a system of µhilosophy 
in th t it holds to a coherent world~view, except 
perhaps in the s ns of p rson 1 ethic based on 
unremittin ination. While Kierkega rd was a 
dedicated Christian who was v ry much cone r ,2d with 
what it 11 t to be a Christian 'l' ).~ 1. 
tr n c ha n t at he i t w 11 o s e best re n1 rn be red 
tz che was a 
phor:Lsrn was 
The thcwatic relation hip betw en 
N:L tz c d ier n u rd n 5. t i l1 h i common 
beLl.ef tlrnt human truths can only be adjudged from an 
examination of the ex stent 11v s of individuals. 
Kierkegaard held that, although i • ,llS count ywen saw 
themselves aB Cr,l1l'P,-~fa1·1A (r •j _ ~ ·- c, ~ :r: r om .::: .1 very fact of their 
nationality), few had ny ide of what this should mean 
in terms of leading ch isti n Nietzsche 
contended that god is dead and that people themselves 
had killed him. That is, no one believed any longer in a 
divine guiding hand, yet few were willing to live with 
the consequences of such a state of affairs. That is, if 
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go<l :ts dead, then in a won-, J. and thical ense we as 
sre co;;1p1ete1y tli.rown back upon our own 
resources. can have no recourse to divinely given 
set of laws and mora1 injunctions \Iitll which to order 
our lives • The n a int en an c e of tlli f:\ fiction represents , 
according to Ni tzsche 1 the wart kind of slave 
mentality 
Under the spell of this fictitious od, man can 
n ver truly he rnan in that he cannot taki:'! total 
espo.isibili y for hi i,1 ::1 e 1 f ,, 1\ i v.r a y s t b r the 
teuptation to etr,0;1t into ideology and Nietzsche saw 
chricJtianity as the worst kind of ideology, since it 
relives 1nan of the duty which rnak ht mot human, 
naH1ely the mapping out of Ji '" own moral and ethical 
cou 'fhe ,nbodi nt o .such a person is found iu 
Dietz ch 's cone pt of Uber (:3C h 11 1 which i meant to 
iuply those who pl tely tn cha.r of their own 
1i.vet3 (rather than those who i.e., 
dictators or super men, as the term is often translated. 
u f man n , 1 9 71 , mentions the unsatisfactoriness of many 
translations.) 
Nietzsche's b oad ide at id ology typifies the 
existentialist's ttitude to systems in general. This 
attitude is clearly stated by William Earle in his 
introduction to Karl Jaspers' "Reason and Existence": 
(Jaspers') philosophizing is designed to 
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a en us to our own authentic human situation, and this 
situation, he is convinced, is of such a sort that any 
effort to force it ouceptually or dogmatically, any 
a t tern. p t to s ch e 1n a t i s e t t x ha u ~:;; t i v e 1 y t or t -u. r n i t i n to 
Ofltething known, LIU t tu n into falsification of the 
situation its If and in destruction of our own 
authen ic ossibilitie ." (13) 
Thus one c nnot logically speak o an xistential 
philosophy or systera. 'l'o us(~ the phrase 11 an 
:i.~;tentialist 11 :Ln the way on uses 11 i-la xist-•Leninist", 
in the sen e of p rson who has a set of beliefs about 
the ·world 2nu hot/ it i8 and ,:ihould be etc., is a 
contradiction in terms. If one has a system to order 
one ' s 1 if e tl1 n one co u 1 d not b aid to Le living the 
' t . 1· exis ·ent:La life b use the latter, by definition, 
presupposes au bsenc of the former. 
17 lle aim of xiste tialisw is not to negate 
philosophic 1 or scientific system per se, by asserting 
that thy do not r veal the real world. Rather, the 
existenti 1 critique of science and philosophy derives 
f :rorn th insist nee that the world of science and 
philosophy is a conceptual world, which may b useful in 
an instrumental sense, but hich is unable to help the 
ind :i. vi dual in ld s or her own ex i s ten c e • 011 e co u l d 
counter that this is not clearly the case. For example, 
it may come to be known through scientific investigation 
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thnt tliu u con(\ clJLl.d. horn Li c:v:::i.·y fam:lJy ii; 1•,o:re prone 
and i:lw world thut thL) ucient1fic 
c~1 \t J. cl(:! 11 c. e lrn vin;; onl_y one cldld. Therefore 
(:uup.ll!:; rnay lJ(: uont Lo :::uy 
11e won't." 
TL c· OF knou1cdgc ~ind t 
co11LH,:i:1u nt r,!i,;ovu1 of tiic i11JivJdt1,d. i:roi,1 i:.u,: centre of 
Ll1a L tl1 
ru:l.1 
' ' ' J" J : ; C l ,: H C C , J_) J LL . 0 : ; 0 Jl I / q:c r,!l:i.g:i.oi1 Lim t on 
Lo 
, 
(l C:1] y ',/ i1:i. C )1 
nl.ccndy. I;~ :c ,3 L o 1 :l v e i 1u1 u. L 1 t e Jt J :i ca 11 y 9 
pui.u it in ii,,d fa1Llt" 
cu 1 Lu.J:a:I 1;1 u iJ.uvc Jo,; i. tlu: 
:j JJ O Tl t Li n O U. tz, a vc~_ry 
inclined Lo d . .t· t:. r: 
<:~xi i3 t(}tl ti.al j_ s ts 
1 i !it:L L (.' ,l enough 
or ,,:3 Sartre 




J JO VIC Ve£' I' (;) ,.I cl OU ti O C i3 J1 0 L Ill O L i V ;,), LC O U it C L i On " Jintlwr, it 
itJ pr:Lw.ordiul uLL1 wldch. t.1uidz1s u:::. H.uc:,~;011 fullows in 
L L ::.: pa L Li and _j u u L .i r :i ,, it , r! i ct:.-; s c I 1 e , u :; C r r u 11 ( 19 7 !: ) 
poiuL::: ou.t, 
in direct opposition to t h ri B r i t :i. :J l t r a L i o n a 1 :i n t 
s C h O O 1 0 f th O lJ g !l t O f J • (' 1) !> Mill and the liberals, 
well as to Kaut, Hho be1:i.eved tl,.at: I'(,o.son L:1 the highest 
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power. Our reasons, Nietzsche says, are all given after 
the event, and are themselves the result 0£ a desire to 
appear reasonable, since reasonableness is inculcated 
into us from birth as a desirable attribute. Religion 
and ideology destroy spontaneity. Rationalization and 
popular morality stem from t.hese two and occur when they 
have fallen in to disrepute, according to lHetzBche. 
Despite his attacks on rat±o ty and morality, 
Hietzsche, it must lie noted, <lid not deny that humans 
are capalJle of both. However, when they are foisted onto 
the individual, rather than growing out of him as the 
result of corwcious reflection, then they Eterely serve 
to dress up hls baser tendencies in culturally and 
socially acceptable attire. Nietzsche himself said it 
was his considered task to II make the individual 
uncomfortable. 11 The source of this discoillfort is the 
realisation that our supposed reasons for doing thing 
(eg., "It's christianu, nit's correct"; 11 It 1 s sensible") 
more often obscure the actual motives of our actions'" 
from others and ourselves. 
By pointing out. the hollowness aud cont:lngent 
nature of systems of morality and values, Nietzsche 
clears the decks for individual freedom of action. At 
the same time, he leaves no principles by which to order 
human existence. What, in the absence of commonly shared 
beliefs and values, either secular or religious, :ls to 
prevent: a J.loh1.)ef;iun war of al] against all except 
displays of sheer power nd totalituriun terror? 
Despite ld s vitriolic as:;;.c1 u l tt:J on reason and 
i,.wra1ity, aud tlte facade of our clearly he1d. cultural 
and 8ocial 
C ti ·1 u .1. s arc 
Carroll claims that Nietzsche's 
for 11 pure truth, for o iginu, for the 
pivot of exi8t nee, for traces of the trau[;cendental 11 
(15) ave hi fro cy i is or nihilism. e ca.n see 
Hi tzscli.e i tld light arc: a eo:rt of De:,cart s of human 
actJ .. on , v ho w i n ti. d to e 11 the f lsity of a11 
hi tlier to t;i v n x ltuHt tions, nd bu:L1d a theory of human 
wotivation o solid foundations. 
From Nietzsche the xist 11tia1 traditiou derives 
hi ly ptic 1 a11proach to ,.systews of morality, 
ethic a <l soci l ortler As one who was lliost interested 
to :; k q u st ions c o u c r n in g h u ,u c.l ll u o t :L v a i: ion , iHetz che 
p u t hi 1,1 1 f i n the t aclit:i.on p s y c iio 1 og i ca 1 
writ r; a.n(l his contentio that will or the instincts 
WCI' pcnn,rfu1 govcrnin forces anticipates(~_u) and the 
psychoanalytic school. 
A11 syst ras, Nietzsche aintnins, are inventions. 
no o and L r for no body of ethical or 
Hloral [:, tan<lards, ave t bot'Je ,: invent. These standard:3, 
thus e posed, take on a rather arbitrary nature. Anyone 
who says I must act this vrny because this is the moral 
way is a bdi ca LLng his own freed om. I\y rationalising airny 
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mcrc'ly a unit oi: that ail!Orpliou;; u:,,:.:Js ilietz che call d 
d a a d nihilist. atte pted to 
deu(nrntrate tli t there re nu .Cirl:l moral footholds 
t Ewtt rs for ilietzscile is truth, 
o:c truLhs, th a t w o u l d a i d t li e i r ,• cu g 11 it i u u s 11 o u l d they 
b aco ntt:ire:id n.uo w a:i:t r 11 9 tH;ek r1;:;st und peac 
an J p 1 ea s u r i u our i IHJ. u i r :L 8 '? Ji o , on 1 y tr u U1 , even i :f 
it oe tlie lllOSt aL!llorr Ht and ugly 1'1 (lG) 'fhe ueans by 
w1licli one should seek this truth re througil r ason and 
e 11t pi r i. Ci t:1.fll 9 ili Lzsche denigrated Uie bccl:Lef that humans 
alway r so1iable er but lie was not 
dc,c:cyiug the v 1u of r son, vr u Hying thdt lrn1ilans 
could be direct d by th :Lr ow11 reasouing. 
h ve no nwre iuportant tas t u to tesci1 rigorous 
thin ing, cautious judgement and consistent inference. 
Therefore thy should leave alone whatever is not 
s u i ta b 1 e f or tlie s e ope :r a ti on s • • • • re 1 i g ion 9 i: or ex a rn pl e • 
After all, they can be su:r tltat later on man's 
fogginess, habit and need will slacken the bow O f ,. an 
all-too-taut thinki Europe was wade Europe by 
reason in the schools; in the i'Ii<ld.1,~ Ages Europe was on 
(17) 
,·.::,' ;") C .;;; depiction of 
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tii. !lUllJaI! condition 
d v 1ops somewLat s fol1ows Urdin rily wear asleep 
::nnl it :i. n 1 y t lir o ugh on t n L vi i 1 a c tl! t w may 
ar doing 
it. Our ctions und attitud r o likely to beco 
lrnL:Ltual tltat uur raLiouality :b, uonet tin that gets 
aLt chcd to an action after tlt0 "~V,:'o.L, 1Jecaus we were 
au1e p wlien it occurred. I t i ,; on 1 y l! c Ll so 1,1 t~ one or 
souE,tiiins stnrt1us uc to arik n,ifhy did you do t.!i t'? 11 that 
we wak nd fiJ.1 it ueccssary to 
HlfL 1J Ufa C t Ure d Our drow iness d.:Liiiui he our 
in Lhi:, Lat at U,.e uercy of 
\Iii a t. v t.:! r f or c iu y i L111 i 11 gt:· up o ,1 t u. t:3 @ (; n 1. y 1} ·f a 11 untiring 
tio ins 0 tt rs nd conditions L11aL e llO ma11y 
t for grant d c1 °true 11 , 1l" .. H !J Cl ' or· 
11 1,10:ral. may we 
f i .n d o u r o vl n w a y t o LL n e xi :s t: 1:_: n c e t l! a. t c a n r i ;_;i l L t f u 11 y b e 
called hutian. ietzsche does not, it is asuerted, set 
r son against will. Ratber, t:ln, t1,rn shou1d go hand in 
han(l. Spo tr1ne us, ntl y t capable of r ason this is 
HHH1
1 dual c p liility (although t . . . : 0 H C C S fJ OH C 11 ously and 
b governed by re son does not eem wl,olly compatible. 
Discursive thought often paralyses pontan ity, 
SJ! cially wh n ideas of 11 I 11 enter into that thought.) 
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Nietzsche assails th belief that we a:re somehow 
n8.tu:ral1y :ra tion:::d., without effort. Rather, he 
maintains, the reverse is the ca e. We are sleepwalkers, 
and our rHtionality snd o·ur cttlture are usually no 1nore 
than llrn.sks w pull over our races to dis~uise our 
omnambul nee from ourselves and others. Nietzsche was 
no less critical of c rtain orientations to science than 
h c •11 as to o t tic r rl i s to r ti n rntionalisntions. nAgainst 
that positivism (of Comte et al) which stops before 
r,l1r~:nor:1.ena E:~J y:i "ther arr,, only fact II I ,c!l1ould say: 
no, it is n eci ely f • ct th t rlo not ist, only ii 
interpret tion n (H,) 
Th fi ot: thing that mot people noti e about 
H e i d e g g e r i s h o ,1 rn u c h c~ f f o r t i. t t a. k e s t o :r e a d h i 111 • 
Tennessen lyrical about 11 ••• the general 
continental r,randiloquencc and the particularly pompous 
teutonic turgidity i.n H idef; e 's higl1--flown lutinated 
con g 1 om er ate of b o in bast :i c n e o 1 o g isms 11 ( l 9 ) 
It must be admitted however, that Heidegger's 
subject matter does not lend itself to a description by 
a vocabulary to be found in the sun<lay papers. We can 
either say nothing or we must say a lot. Heidegger chose 
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the second alternative. In the introduction to 11 0n the 
Essence of Truth" there is an attempted explanation of 




" ••• the most dazzlingly finished (of 
become "eternal truths". Presupposed in such 
faith or science or eveo the university of 
life however, is a kind of opening or openness by virtue 
of which something can and does show itself, and let 
itself be seen. This opening resists depiction. Indeed, 
the attempt to speak of it becomes embodied in the most 
complicated abstrusities in order to let this quite 
simple thing - which is no thing at all - show itself 
and become manifest.n (20) Such may be said of being in 
general, and Heidegger's abstrusity arises from bis 
attempts as an academic (rather than as a novelist or 
playwright) to depict that which r.annot be 





many other existentialists, Heidegger 
the label (since to acknowledge it would 
put him in company he would rather do without) 
is apparent that his abiding themes were also 
those of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and the like* He differs 
from these two in that, as Warnock says, n he was a 
system-builder in the Hegelian mould." (21) And like 
Hegel, he pushes language to the limits of 
communicability. It is from Heidegger, however, that the 
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European school of existential psychology and 
psychotherapy has derived its theoretical and conceptual 
foundation. 




Warnock states that it is difficult to ascertain 
Heidegger's works) what the problem is with any 
of exactitude. In the sense that Heidegger 1 s 
style and snbject matter is far-removed from the British 
tradition of language analysis, the above assertion is 
true. However, it is not so much that there is no 
problem but rather that the nature of the questions 
posed , for example: "why is there something rather than 
nothing?"; "what does it mean 'to be'?"; "what does it 
mean to say "I am"?" make 
conceptualise in any immediately 
However, to return to being. 
them difficult to 
satisfying manner. 
Krell (1978) maintains that by 1922 Heidegger had 
achieved a number of principle insights which could aid 
hi~ in his explication of the nature of being: 
(1) His phenomenological training under Husserl had 
developed in him an •allegiance to the things 
themselves"; 
(2) Truth, rather than being a function of 
"c~rrectness" or correspondence of things with 
assertions about them, was the unconcealment of self-
showing that made it possible for things to be the 
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objects of statements or assertions in the first place. 
(3) Truth as unconcealment indicated the presence 
(which is in time as well as space) of a thing as a 
vital factor. Thus, the meaning of being required an an-
alysis of timee Being and time are inextricably linked. 
Heidegger saw that it was the investigation of the 
being who could raise questions about his own being that 
would pave the way for an analysis of Being in general. 
An individual who already has some understanding of 
Being through his ability to question his own being is 
given the designation "Dasein", by Heidegger. Thus 
Heidegger is led to en analysis of the modes of being 
of Dasein, which is Man. Heidegger is not concerned to 
reduce Dasein, and thus explain him, as some would have 
it, but to describe the manner of existence of Dasein. 
Dasein is always projecting into the future. It is 
always becoming what it, at the moment, is not. At the 
same time, it has a past over which there is no control. 
Thus Dasein must deal with the "throwness 11 of its own 
existence; the way in which it is projected out of the 
past, its history. That we are greatly influenced by 
forces out of our past, 
(including historical), 
"facticity". As well 
both genetic and environmental, 
is indicated by the term 
as past and future the present 
influences Dasein in that it may become caught ·up in 
matters of moment, or Verfallen (ensnared). Always a 
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human is projecting into the future, bearing the weight 
of his past, and dealing in some way or other, varying 
from decisiveness to drifting in the present. As well as 
Time, the concept of Death is important to Heidegger's 
analysis. It is a type of benchmark or horizon, which 
puts a perspective on life. Death ends 11 possibilities 
and enableean evaluation of life. If I die tomorrow can 
I say my life has been worthwhile - had meaning etc? 
Warnock (1967)is puzzled by the question of Being. 
What exactly is the problem? It is this, would 
Heidegger: For the existing individual, capable of 
reflecting on his own existence, the very fact that he 
is, constitutes, if not a problem in the negative sense, 
then at least a profound puzzle. Why do we exist? The 
asking of causal explanations is a habit taken from the 
nature of our usual commerce with the world, and may not 
be ultimately fruitful in regard to questions of our own 
existence. However, it cannot be denied that we have the 
tendency to pose such questions. Why should we live 
moral or useful or socially acceptable lives, when, as 
being capable of imagining the future, we can envisage 
our own deaths and the negation of all we have done? 
Humans seek meaning both provisional and ultimate. We 
may deny that there is any ultimate meaning, but few are 
likely to admit the possibilty t their everyday 
existence and affairs have not one iota of meaning or 
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consequence. It is our striving to seek and create 
meaning in the light of our knowledge of the world, that 
constitutes the question of being. 
It is from Heidegger that the notions of 
authenticity and inaut ticity are taken. How one may 
live au ntically :requires an lanation 
Heidegger's distinction between "existentiell" 
of 
and 
11 existenti II understanding. 11 Existence is decided only 
by each Daseio itself, in the manner of seizing upon or 
neglecting ••• possibilities. come to terms with the 
question of existence always only through existence 
itself - this kind of understanding of itself is 
existentiell understanding. The question of existence is 
an ontic affair of Dasein." (22) (Thus Dasein is to be 
discriminated from other beings by the very fact that 
one of its characteristics is to pose for itself the 
ontological question - the question of ing.) 11 Fo this 
theoretical perspicuity of the ontological structure of 
existence is not necessary (i.e.j we do not need to 
understand what being "is"). The question of structures 
aims at an analysis of what constitutes existence. We 
s 11 call the coherence of these structures 
"existentialityn. Analysis does not have the character 
of an existentiell understanding, but rather an 
existential one."(23) Heidegger uses the term 
11 exist,rntiell 11 here to characterise the different ways 
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in which Dasein may live its life - its different modes 
of existence, as 11 parent 11 , "employee", ber of the 
team", etc., and in these modes it is capable of 
ignoring or realising its own possibilities. One such 
possibility is to inquire into the structure of its own 
life and possibilities. The kind of un rstanding 
thereby gained Heidegger calls 11 existentialn. 
To become so deeply immersed in ones role that 
one's orientation, e.g., to one's wife and family is 
through the role of company executive, is to live 
inauthentically. Sartre was later to say that we are all 
incapable of escaping this condition entirely and on the 
basis of the definition this seems likely to be true. We 
are apt to fall into the roles we are called upon to 
play and become enmeshed in them. It would seem however, 
that even in playing a role it is possible ta remain 
aware of its provisional nature. Such awareness is a 
pre-condition for an authentic life. Although 
stylistically far apart, Heidegger's likenesses to 
Kierk aard 
apparent., 
and Nietzsche in matters of theme is 
The way in which idegger philosophizes, which is 
quite unlike, for instance, the British styl of 
linguistic analysis, derives from what he sees as the 
philosopher's task. "For the existentialist it is not 
the task of philosophy to provide a final and 
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comprehensive explanation of everything, as though the 
various natural sciences explain particular bits of 
reality, while philosophy, like some kind of super-
science explains the whole of reality. Rather, the task 
of philosophy is to re-discover and make explicit that 
elusive and primordial realm of experience that 
underlies the whole of our existence in the world."(24) 
Heidegger argues that we need to cultivate a new way of 





"being" - so 
itself to us 
that reality 
in all its 
unpredictable variety and richness." (24) Thus, for 
Heidegger, philosophizing is not a matter of proving 
such and such by means of a water-tight argument. Rather 
11 in philosophy I cannot prove anything to you, but I 
think I can show you some things." 
S A R T R E 
Sartre, who Laing, Cooper and others have 
acknowledged as influential to their thinking, took 
human freedom as his major concept. Although he was 
persuaded to narrow somewhat the scope of this freedom 
from that contained in his earlier works, he always 
maintains that we essentially make ourselves. Talking 
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about his analysis of eudian and Marxist thought, 
Sartre says 11 I have tried to do the following •••• to 
indicate the limit of psychoanalytical and marxist 
interpretations and to demonstrate that freedom alone 
can account for a person in his totality, to show his 
freedom at grips th stiny, crushed at first by its 
mischances, then turning upon t m and digesting them 
little by little, to prove that genius is not a gift but 
the way out tl1at one invents in desperate cases." (25) 
basis of human freedow is self-reflecting 
consciousness, and imagination. These capacities enable 
us to go beyond merely what is; to conceive of what is 
not yet the case. Sartre's analysis of consciousness 
leads to an eventual dualism which splits consciousness 
off from things, and by logical extension, man from t 
world. "If we assume a consciousness placed in the very 
bosom of the world, as one e istent among others, we 
must conceive it, hypothetically as completely subjected 
to the action of a variety of realities - without its 
being able to transcend the detail of these realities, 
by an intuition that would embrace their totality. This 
consciousness could therefore contain 





imagination would be prohibited to it, exactly in the 
degree to which it was involved in the real. The 
conception of imagination enmired in the world is not 
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unknown to us, since it is precisely that of 
psychological determinism." (26) shall have mon~ to 
say of determinism, psychological and otherwise, further 
on. c, _ r r, r> ,)UI I: 1 ..... e to say t t Sartre considered th t 
consciousness could not be grounded in merely what is, 
since this would subject it to the suppos d determinism 
of the natural world. 
Devoid of the imaginative capacity, consciousness, 
for Sartre, was 11 crushed 11 in the wo:rliL Imagination 
takes us beyond what is given. This same ability, 
however, cuts man off from the world - the union t t 
is always trying to achieve, but which can never occur, 
according to Sartre. Ilecause consciousness depends on 
standing aloof from the world, it can never be identical 
with that world, and therefore never know it, except as 
an object. The result of such a state of affairs is 
examined by tre in such nov ls as nNausea", and "The 
Roads to Freedomn trilogy. In "Being and Nothingness" 
Sartre posits two dimensions of being: 
(a) "en-soi" (being i itself): This is an 
approximate to the objective world. One might say the 
posssibilty of the objective world; 
(b) "pour-soi" (being for itself): This is roughly 
equivalent to consciousness. 
By means of a type of dialectical relation of the pour-
soi to the en-soi, the former emerges as consciousness 
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oriented to an object world. By being acted on the en-
soi emerges as the object world. The pour-soi 
(consciousness) apprehends that the en-soi (things) 
exists prior to itself and is at its base. TJ1ings are 
here, and I am one thing among them. T!1us is conti ency 
(throwness or facticity in Heidegger) characterised. 
Sartre's indication of how consciousness could 
arise in the first place, given that it is at great 
remove from "things" is di icult to support since he 
seems almost, at times, to be invokin vitalism, or else 
he is contradicting himself by giving to things that 
which he says they cannot possess, namely, imagination. 
"The emergence of consciousness in tl1is contingent world 
refers indeed to the effort of an en-soi to found 
itself; it corresponds to an attempt on tl1e part of 
being to remove contingency from its being. The r ror~ 
itself origin e in a revolt of t en-soi, which 
nihilates itself against its contingency." (27) 
It is from this "split" between consciousness and 
objects that the basic human project arises. As Sartre 
would have it, all human projects are variations on this 
single theme. Perhaps this project is, at first, best 
characterised if we state t t men is lonely in the 
world. His imagination, wl1ich frees him from things, 
also cuts him adrift from an existence to whicl1 he, at 
one level, very much belongs. We wish to belong to the 
42 
world, and for the world to belong to us. Sartre points 
out that the concept of "god" entails this mode of 
being. Our project is thus to be god; to unite the en-
soi with the pour-soi. According to the logic 
Sartre's analysis, such a synthesis is impossible~ 
are always cast back on ourselves. T world arises from 
the negation of consciousness earing itself away" om 
what merely is. Consciousness is necessarily separated 
from objects by a chasm. The chasm not only separates 
both, but indeed makes both pos ible. There can be no 
union of the perceiver with what is p rceived, since 
such a union would annihilate both. The impossibility of 
uniting the en-soi and the pour-soi modes of being is 
related to Sartre's notion of inauthenticity, or "b 
faith 11 ("mauvaise .foi 11 ). 
To imagine that one has become identical vith some 
role, object or position, is to fall into bad fai 
This necessarily ntails a surrender of freedom. nBad 
faith is self-deception; specifically, the attempt to be 
something as if in a thing-li manner, as if I were an 
in-itself - as when I try to be this or that or 1 
to be a sincere person, as if any of these were a 
condition I could absorb." (28) Sartre is implying that 
it is the nature of a human being to be in a constant 
state of flux. Answers given to the question "Who are 
you? 11 or n\Jhat sort of person are you?", can only be 
provisional or valid in a liwited time span. It is 
rather like asking nwhat shape are clouds?" One cannot 
truthfully say that one is un honest person, for 
example, since, according to Sartre, the concept of 
honesty entails the notion of its opposite. can only 
say II nest 11 if we have some sort of criterion for 
judging what "honest" is not. Therefore, the idea 
11 hones t 11 esupposes t i a of "dishonest 11 • 
Consciousness is an unending process of creating 
antl projecting onto the world wl1at is not, in terms of 
new goals, ideas 9 and ways of being. Bad faith is an 
attempt to crystallise the fluid reality of existence, 
mainly for reasons of security of self. (This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 3). As mentioned earlier, 
Sartre is of the opinion that bad faithi as he conceives 
it, is a trap into which all must fall. the jaws of the 
trap are mad up of our concepts and values. e 
knowledge of the idea 11 bad faith 11 entails a notion of 
what is not - sincerity. Yet to be 11 sincere 11 is itself 
to act in bad faith. This entails a reifying of 
sincerity 11 as if one could stop and say nNow I am 
sincere, and if I cease to move from this (metaphorical) 
spot, I will remain sincere. 11 It seems that Sartre is 
implying that an overdose of self-reflection leads to 
bad ith. He puts this succinctly as follows: "It is 
bad faith for the for-itself (consciousness) to try to 
be what it 1."' ,a ' because it is as being the being which is 
what it is not, and which is not what it l• c·, ""' that the 
for-itself projects what it is. 11 (29) 
The fluidity of being, so implied, necessitates a 
spontaneity that is usually found in small children, who 
do not see themselves through the eyes of others, and 
only rarely in adults. Thus Sartre at first denies any 
possibility of a union between consciousness and 
objects, except in the spurious union achieved in bad 
faith. This impossibility proceeds logically from his 
analytical division of being. However, he does, later, 
allow that the en-soi/pour-soi fusion may occur, namely, 
in reading. "The basic ontological ct is t 
consciousness exists only through detaching itself from 
being, but in reading I bring this process to e 
momentary stop. I attain a transcendental and absolute 
end, which, for a moment, suspends the utilitu ian round 
of end-means and mearis=end. 11 (30) This is a rather 
curious about-face, and perhaps reflects Sartre's 
literary biasses, and his great passion for the well-
In reading, according to rtre, 
consciousness may be stopped, in the sense that it does 
not immediately detach itself from what is in 
consciousness. Why this shoul<l be possible in the act of 
readingj as opposed to watching a movie, or staring out 
of the window, doesn't seem obvious. As well as this, 
I. , • .., .. ) 
Sartre's admittance of aa exception, no doubt taken from 
his own expcrienct;~ calls into questi<rn the validity of 
l1is so-called ''basic ontological fact". An abiJing theme 
in Jar tre 's novt~ls a n<l plays is the al ie nation of lrnmans 
from eacla other and the world. ~artre seeks to establish 
the basis of this alienation in a diviuiou oI being. We 
ar~ alone because we are conacious beings, and 
consci.ouauess on to.i 11.:l dt: tacrna .. ~n t anu o!J j ec tif ica U.ori. 
Save for the writings of Heis&er Eckhart, and other 
christian mystics, there is little writtt!il on this 
su tij cc t of ti,e union of consc io u::n1e1:3s 1.1ud the wor 1 d in 
the westen, trntlitions~ Variol!i:ii recc.~nt accounts would 
include those oI £1aise PaHcal, Al<lous iluxley 1 Arthur 
Kotstler (deci<letlly not a mystic), Freud (his "oceanic 
need not pursue this line ui inquiry. ~ufiice to say 
thut it is Jartre 1 a concepts Gi freedom, bad faith, 
interest ua Nost. 
ll E 1< L E A U f' 0 ii 'f Y 
~erleau-Ponty, the last existentialist we shall 
consider in this overview, seeks to provide a way out of 
the blind alley posed by the strict subject/object 
dicliotomy of much traditional philosophy, and that of 
Sartre's ontological analysis. fiesically, he steers a 
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micldl patli bet\Ieen historical/environmental determinism 
and a 1 iely idealistic and unsupportable 
U1co y of indivi<lual freedom (eg., Sartre). 
Empiricism, according to Merleau-Ponty, erroneously 
tr ats th:Lngs as :l.f they wer sirnply th I'EJ; facUJ, which 
ar in<l pend nt of th perceiver and the moment of 
perception. Id alism adopts the opposite tack, of 
placing absolute reality in the subject. A strict 
empiricism eliminates any possibility of even a limited 
fr clout of iu:lt.:lative and re ponsibility (in fact 
11 :c sponsilJ:il:Lty 11 has no tie ning in a determini tic 
w or 1 d ) • Id 1 i :; 1>1 , and ; 1 er 1 au - Pont y here inc 1 u des some 
pl1 no1,1enological interpretations, so thoroughly cuts the 
perceiver fr t: fro1;1 the world., t t no reasonable amount 
of (eg.,) error, opinion, or historical influences, can 
i·l~ r 1 ea u--F1 011 ·t y was influ need by th g stalt 
p:3yclwlogists to so1c1e xtent. He concludedll in short, 
that no e perience can be regarded as an isolated Ern-
soi. 11 I~very new experience liJUSt de-center the dynamic 
unity of e perience, to make a place for itself. Every 
part can exercise an influence over the whole, as any 
change in the whole can change the sense of the moment.u 
(31) Merleau-Ponty proposes an idea of experiental 
reality which he terms "en soi pour nous" ([things] in 
theJ!lselves .!''or U'·') .L. . ,W ' which encompasses the concept of a 
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unified reality and an interdependence of things and 
consciousness. Those who posit strict ernpiricism or 
idealism, do so, Herleau-Ponty maintains, because they 
t a proven the effect that the "exterior can have on 
the s lf as causality". ::.;artre, for example, rejects a 
fusion oft ngs and consciousness, because he assumes 
t t causality is operative and would play a determining 
role in consciousness. 
To eliminate the absolute subject/object duality, 
and yet rnaintain a d gree of individual freedom, 
He:rleau-Ponty uses his idea of "rnotivution 11 , as opposed 
to causality. Causality is, he says, a product of 
oh j e c t i vis in g thou g l1 t . I t i s not j/ s o ltt et hi n g p r i lli or di a 11 y 
exper::Lenced. 11 ( ".'l .. ) _, L, Rather, genetic and historical 
factors provide "resistances in tlie field of e perience 11 
which solicit und provoke, rather than form mv ---.,, 
int rpr tation;:;1, c lling i:ortlt a gamuL r· 01 pos ible 
interpretations and contexts accor<ling to which they 
will only then become more <leterllline<l. Hothing is 
entirely forign to us, Merleau-Ponty would assert, in 
contrast to Sartre. The very fact that we can perceive 
an object necessitates that we are 11 open 11 to it in some 
way. That is, that we have the c pacity to construe it 
as we do. "All solicitations or obstacles I may find in 
my world need this world to appear at all, and must 
derive their sense ultimately froin the capacity to 
structure which I bring to the perceptive act; tlwy 
present themselves mor as intentions, potential 
vectors, invitations to action t n as unequivocal 
objects or absolute <letermiuations '' (33) He leau-Ponty 
arriv s at these conclusions by his analysis of 
p rception. He asserts that belief in a supposed 
subject/object dichotomy is merely the result of an 
unrefl ctiv comnwnsense view of the world, and 
does not characterise the actual state of affairs. To 
maintain a consciousness-versus-world split is 
Ile contencls 1 Di.nee it leads to 
em p i r i c i s 1,:i , ,;, or i <le a 1 i s m , JHd t It er o f w hi ch a cl e qua t e 1 y 
describe the experience of being iu the world, which is 
one n ither of deterrniniGm nor of unlimited freedom. It 
way be countered on the ewpiricist side, that our 
ignorance of the exact nature of causality and a lack of 
data leads us to asSUh! ad gree C en. freedoHI. which does 
not actually exist and which could be explained causally 
if such data were avail tile. This shall not be discussed 
at present, but suffice to say that the theories of 
* his is not to deny that the wethods of empirical 
sci nee are useful or that they are incapable of 
developing knowledge of a high degree of truthfulness. 
It l." ,:;; the faith in the scientific method, ✓ 
which is itself not without bia~::, which rleau-Ponty is 
critical of. 
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causality (especially its universality) and strict 
determinism, are by no means as solid as once they 
s emed. (See references to Popper in Chapter III). 
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CJtAI'TER II 
E:XI;;TEN'rIALISH AND NATURAL SCif~NCE .PSYCJJOLOGY 
Exi tentialists <lo not see as th ir task the 
prov id in 6 of a w or 1 d-e x p 1 a in in g unity • 
11 l< a the r , the task 
of philosophy i:3 to re discover and 1:1akE, xp1icit that 
lusive and primordial realm of experienc that 
und lies th whole of our existence in the world.n (1) 
E istentia1isrn has its roots in central 1•:urope and 
has icn~ertetl 1itt1e influeuce over the British schools of 
plJJlosophy, which llave, for the rnost part, been 
dornin Led by tiH' 11 rnovern nt. oL 1in uistic analysis," (2) 
whicl1 L::; tro1.1 0 ly L~>1tp:l:ri.c1;;d and positivi1:1t, and "'takei::: 
scientific nowledge as cent:cal and paradignwt:ic; and 
other f orHlS ,. ' 1 d o I K 11 o v.r e _ g e are asses eel by reference to 
:it.ii (]) Charlesworth sees l~ngl:Lsh scientific pliilosophy 
as being bound to the 11 enl ightenwen t idea 1 of 
rationality. 11 Carroll (1974) claiws that English 
philosophy is provincial and irrelevant to man, in that 
it has abandoned social and ethical concerns in favour 
of abstract linguistic analysis. 
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The relationship between existentialism and British 
emp:iricist philosophy parallels, largely the 
relationship, within psychology, of existentialism to 
what we shall call, for the sake of differentiation 1 ✓ 
positivist psychology. This latt r term is meant to 
signify that orientation to psychology ·whicb t:3ees the 
study of man as being an extension of th natural 
sc1.ences. Just as a large numb r of British and Ameri.can 
philosophers find the exist nt:i.alists de1cidedly 
unrigorous, and often obfuscating, the positivist 
p ychologi[3tf, in e is tent i a 1 p s y clw 1 o g y , an 
11 u n s c i en ti f i c 11 and t here fore , in 21 d 1•d. s s i b 1 e a pp :roach to 
the subject matter. 
If w are to asses the role of existentialism in 
psychology, then we must also make :i.t clear wlwt it is 
that psycho 1 o g y a i ni to e 1 u c id at It is the fact that 
different people have somewhat differing views as to 
wi1 t p io y c ho J o :; i t:E3 are tryin:; to do; I • ' .l:LC ll a1lows them 
to see a negative, or no role for 
exist:entialiEnn in psyci1o1ogy. If we consider the usual 
deLini tion of psychology as the study of human 
behaviour, we must further ask what differentiates a 
psychologist from physiologist, bio1ogist, or 
anthropologi.st? It is considered by this writer that it 
is the recognition of man's conscious, self-reflecting 
and thinki.ng dimension, that differentiates psychology 
from the afore-mentioned endeavours. 
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Saint-Simon and Cowte are usually allowed the 
ho u o u r o f i n i L.i. t i n g t h e t ens i o n o _[ t. he HJ c t bod G o f t he 
n Lura1 sciences to tl1e f,;tudy of uan. This positivism 
views man as an oLject to b i; t u d .L e (i , a n cl the aiws of 
tld;;;: study i in ke ping v1itl1 the aims of t:he natural 
J:H'e(lic tion and control. 
Mally would be unhappy with tile notion that 
con c:i.ou~nt ss iE; vital to psychology, but, if we are to 
b s a study of man on colourless reflex, (I1u11) then 
psy ciwlogy 
reducible 
is Lynum ans uniqu and would appear to be 
to physiology. At pre;:;e!! L fatany of even th 
mot d dicaLed beh viouri t s e Lit Lo iutrocluce a 
cognitive elemellt into t11e i.t explanations o.i: human 
behaviour, a.1.tliough th t nd ucy to util:Lse the concept 
of neurophysiolu ical 1 vels, 
introcluceEJ intu ti1t?i:r nccount8 111ore epicycl s than a 
n1 c d j_ e v .~J 1 as t :con u El er c o u l d co 1:,1 J. or la b J y en t er ta in 0 It is 
noL int uded ll.lt1·o<luc<', l1,.;.1l~ 1t1ay bG: 
ar L.i. Li c i al d ic lloto1.-1y 11<.:r e, Pt,ychological tlieories and 
p ::,,, y C fl O 1 0 g i S t ~; a nut , en (\I as tH: , Ii o 8 Li 1 e to the co u c e pt s 
of mi.lid and conBciousn 8S 1 a11d exist ntialists are not 
holding the fort 1:;lone against a scientific at,sault on 
hurnanness. It may seem that to set up the b haviourist 
position as tli.e i,wdel for t11en l:ieth century 
to construct a straw man. Outside of 
psychology 
personality 
theory, however, the point of v.iew of the subject or the 
notion of consciousness has not larBely played a role in 
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psychological theory an<l experimentation since Watson. 
Despite recent advances in neurophysiology, 
psycholingujstics, and cognitiv psychology, the 
ubiquity of the behaviour:l.st p:rogra111mc and a wide1:ipread 
acceptance of the beilaviorists 1 positivist criteria of 
method and truth means that the :Lnfluence of 
behaviourism goes fr beyond, in psychology, those who 
would I 'I s e e t n e 111 s ··- v e s as behc1viourist.s j_n th n l • " ,),(:tnnerian 
sense 
Koch (1964) has pointed out that the positivist 
£ rani work wb i c. lJ was ado JJ te d by the bc:d1.av iour-:L 8 t. s was 
long ago given up by itu inventors as !Je:i.ng either 
untenable or fruit.le s, but has .st:lll maintained its 
hold in psychology. Behavioural positivism gained its 
popularity due to its methodology, l'1hich ,:J.fiP ared to 
provide useful guidelines to an e perirn ntal science 
barely yet begun and wanting to foot it with the 
t bli h d n tu Rl ci nc n but th pra tic,~ of 
f:,c.i ntific u1ethod n w b ginning to ewerg among 
phy:sicists etc. cha11 ng s the behavioural conce1_.1tion of 
science, and the imported methodological view on which 
it was based, at virtually every point. 11 (!¼) 
Koch (5) rnak ad tailed critique of behaviourism, 
but we will consider just a few points: 
(1) A major part of the behaviourist programme was the 
assertion that replication and reliability etc were 
based on "fixed linkages with objective indicators." 
SL, 
Rules are said to govern the construction, use and 
t e 8 ting o f a t he o r y • '1' hes e r u 1 e s a r e a li 1 e to b e - must 
be - thoroughly articulated. However, it has long been 
acknowledged (in other fields), that this idea of full 
formalization is untenable. Scientific advancement 
depends on, among ot r things, 11 in<livi<lual serwibilityj) 
discrimination, judgement and guess. 11 
( t'. ) 11 Analysis 01: the;: uature of lo cal and 
mathematical systems has revealed new complexities; few 
would be content now with tiie view that rega.cds f orrnal 
statements a s t a u t o 1 o g i e s • 11 '1' h i t:J w o u l <l c a 11 into 
question the usefulness of the concept of reinforcement, 
since this is defined as that wilich will increase the 
likelihood that a ~ehaviour will occur in the future. 
Behaviour is said to be under the control of 
reinforcers. ~✓ hat a r e r e info .r c er s '? T 11 in gs that c on t o 1 
behaviour. This is ec.:ssentially tautological, and leaves 
unaddressed the question oJ: why 9 
should be a reinforcement for one person, and of no 
consequence to another. 
(J) Positivist critiques of consciousness use the 
verifiability theory of meaning (i.e., the use of 
procedures to determine whether a statement is true or 
false. If no procedure could be carried out to determine 
the verifiablity of the statement n1 made up wy mind to 
go to the movies, so I went", then it would be said to 
be meaningless from the point of view of verifiability, 
a.nd therefor(~ not ope11 to scientific investigation.) as 
ju::;tification ior ruli11.z coH:,ciousner:s or il!.ental states 
o u t o f t 1t e IJ o ll u d cs o f J>fi y c !to 1 o t! .i c a 1 c on s i d er a t i o H • K o ch 
poiuts out Li.1ut nuch crlt ria l1av fullen by the 
criteria 
vdl:icl! :::;tablish tlte liu:Lts of coguitive u1,,'Hu:l.1.1 fulness, 
ar i tie g i V H u 11 a s e 1 f ·- B t u 1 t i y i 11 g or !1 ve bee ome 
su 1 i be:r Li.sell a to ;<wke t lie1i1 c oi;1pat i bl 1,d. th cer ta:i.n 
classes 
,. 
o:c 1\tG tap sical st c J..:oth Carnap, 
one of tlt(' i)\0 L iL!fluential of tit logic 1 po,1ltivists, 
\J • ' rid )j 111 i:rn , t lJ e orig L w \ tor of th p:roc dure C 01. 
o fl r a t L o ll n 1 i tJ llt , c 1 a i ,11 t: ha t n t li t 5 .cs t- per;;; on r po r t i s 
ess Htial to significant op :rational a11 lysis in 
pri cl1Jl nd, iu pi:;ycholo le 1 nnd s,ici 1 conte ts, 
rnaudatory in practic • 11 
( L, ) 'f h n o t :L o 11 o f p u b 1 t c v e r i £ i a b :i 1 :i t y t tJ ll o L t. h e a 11 
or nothing a ff ,.i r L l1 at th b !1av:Louri1:Jt iu,dst that it 
Koc li po:i.nt: out tli t th 11-111 UB. e cou1J1unities in 
w/iich t,cientific communicat:ion go ~~ on~ are often 
e c ,~ d :t n & 1 y .':J 1,, a 11 , du to peclulisation, and the need 
£or " fee 1 in g II for th cl a ta , w ll i c h on 1 y com s fro 111 1 on g 
personal invo:Lvewent in the fi 1d in qu stio11. 
(5) F:ln lly, til:i.ty of that favourite 
psychological 11 behavio11r 11 , is called into 
question.What e actly, is behaviour, and does affi ing 
this 1ahe1 to a phenomenon he1p un to understa.nd what it 
i ? "TlH~ over-abstxact character of the concept of 
behaviour (anrl that of stimulus) t n<ls finally to 
p:rod uce th,:> :L 11 us ion that a cone e pt ual 1 y ho11w;_;eneous set 
ol lawful re1ationsliip,3 has been achii~vecl, or is 
· · l ·1 acu:u2va J_e, Lu 1) ycbology.n (7) 
Existenl:iali~srn is a huroc.-).n centred raode of thought~ 
L1 JJ .c, y c lt o 1 o g y tl d. :c; iin pl i s t ha t a 11 e x p l a n a t i on s o f 
human action a.r to begin frorn the viewpoint of the 
individual as the pivotal locus of t-:1ction and originator 
of meaning. Helrnvioural analysis, up to now, has often 
ntailed dtt wptr:; to r duce human pltenowena to :lts 
si1,.1plest COJ•JJ?OHents. Tllis i::: an app oac:h renlin:i.sc:ent of 
t ti e o 1 tl a t o !,t :L s t 1 c 1 d ea o f w at t .r , and is obviously not 
compatible 1dt thee j_stentiE11 view. 
The objectlun that rna11y psychologists have to 
considering a (positive) role for e istentialism in 
1rnychology it; Urnt :Lf psychology is to maintain its 
;:;tatus af.J an periraental science, then it cannot afford 
t i corpo t en.tali tic notions of causality, and 
even if it does include a cognitive component, this 
cow p on en t 111 u :3 t lJ e e x p 1 :i c b 1 in terrn.s of antecedent 
eventse Thus, notions of future r ference, teleological 
or finalistic tnterpretations, are considered 
inadmissible. Existential theorists, starting as they 
clt~x their Hn.alys1.s of man from the expe:riencer' s 
position, definitely regard conceptions of the future as 
being fundamental to the description of being-in-the-
world. Heide3ger is quite explicit on this point. Dasein 
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is the being who i.s always in the proc ss of becoming 
wlint it i:3 not, 
Let u look t\J efore at the ,: 0 J.. 
e planntion, wi L li 
,, 
(!1.er nc to tlie {uture. Teleological 
explan tious entail r ferenci::', iH the case 
,. 
OI living 
be 1. n gs , t o ends :rn d go a 1 3 'J.'! 1 us t; i. ll o ti o H of p u r po t:i e is 
i plicit. 'J.' leology du s HQt ll rily ntail th 
a r g u ui u t f r o rn d e cd g n ; the 110tion that v rytlling in the 
u n iv er s e was d t·3 :t g n e d b y a n o iH n i po t en [; ing tu be put 
to use for rna.u I EJ good. il ny th ol':i.t~t an<l r :~ archers in 
tl10: l>iologic;c,.1 sci nc i:, e pecic:111y a sert that the 
e plnuationc3 of th action:c.t of 1:iving sy L 111ad 
rnore inte11igilil by r f rrine to tit ir goaJ.s or 
purpos Soul , 1 i k e Ja c 4 u e s 11 o n o d ( 1 9 7 1 ) , vr it o e rn p 1 o y s 
tl1 spec:1aJ cate1:;u:cy of ntel onowy 11 to cl scr:Lb the 
purposive s :r:Lving of liv:Lng system thejr 
full potentiality, c,e 0oa1 d:i. ect:iou eve11 at tbe level 
of HIDCr !ii O 1 CU J S , 
1Tl1u::,;, i11 ansv1er· to ti1e que y is that person 
runr1ing El. !1und.rt?d rnil ~3 ft t1t~ek7'' 1 , the fact that he 
int nds to run in th Hoston ilaratltou 1,rould se01n to 
µrovide important explanatory <l ta. 'f 1cjologtca1 
e 1>1auations hav oft n be n avoid <l, due to tl1e:Lr 
mi coIJception~ i t se m to thi w ite , or 
influences actini:, backv1ards :ln ti.we, ancl drawine th 
prer:1ent towards tb.emse1ves. liow ver, once 1H .. " include th 
i c1 a of con ciou::sues ~ even i. f t l d. can u o t b wholly 
e () 
_) () 
satisfactorily a ticulatecl, t.11 :id a of future ref rence 
does not se;:rn at all wy1:;t rious. Qu:Lt ap rt from tl1 
fJ tr :l vi n g of 1J i o 1 o ;; i ca 1 y ,; terns to a chi e v their full 
pot: ntia1, C O 71 t.J C ). 0 US 11 fj 
allow o p 1a11, 
the f orF1 1.r,_,_ v;-,_, j t 
to jnggl cone ptua1 and 
syrnbolic ,01ysternE, so a to pi.au fo events :in future 
One couJ.d counter, of cour::;e, tll t our ontions 
'· 
re only 
t o e that \~ ha v cquir d, nd tllat tller Iore our 
. . . 
]. f(l a i{ l. :n. 1. n g D. dei:er in d by 1i st v nU; Popp r (1982), 
1101,; ver, bn;; d mon trated tr1 ,Jpur:Louc2, n Lure of 
scie;'•ntific cl tr::r1,1in:i w, anrl to ,Haintain th t 1111 future 
a c t i o n ht a y b s e H :i n p r i n c 1 p 1 by virtue of a perfect 
knoH1 d 1~ of Lh r jnforcem nt l1istory nd relevant laws 
of beh viour i not only pruct:ically, buL logically 
impot:rnib1e.~' 
The behc1viourist I s pro::;r:un,n of JH od ic ti on and 
co tro1 h8.,3 co to hJCan for them that th t;e aims are 
not only desirable but quite possible. Hence thci.r 
d terrninist stat1ce, which cannot allow l:or goal or 
purpose. 
Perhaps r a on ble criticis of i t e 11 ti a 1 ism is 
that it do "" not readily lend itself to scientific 
investigation. It rnak s a number of assertions but it is 
not clear whetlHJr such assertions can be tested. This 
* s urn rn a. r y o f P o .P p r ' s a r g u H1 E~ n t i s :l n t h e a p p e n d i x 0 
5() 
rei,\H.:tll tliE:.: cc:1se u.s 1onJ..:i a psychology adL1eres to 
t 11 r u c r u ,; t e c1 n dCJ_ ltt\fic cr:Lter:ia et Lueth by 
It: ti1t-l t: CUJ1[.3Cj_\)Uf.JHL~Sd Uil{l .• .l IH 1. !l l.1 
c H Lr1.: l to . ' t UC~ CUlJC pt:ion of be:lngw 
Po :it:tvi Lie p :.J y C h () 1 0 2,; .Y has i10 utie for such notions 
E }st nti J l.c1.l k of sue ii as 
a:: Lt:Lug 11 1.:wiquely ltuwan 11 do 
n,.Jt h Jp, IJ UH i L J.. V j_ U t 8 , JHCJ.H [.'l..S on. 
au:iinal i:lll,tUllg h!Hilj u i: h c 1.· 11 an d UC )1, : ..LS tt1:1e11a hle to 
SLltdy by r,te r le unL to th rec;t 
,. 
OL Lli 1;1urld o:[ 
Livii,G ( 1al ior that c ~H~ Lna;,i_m,ii.e) 1,1atL<:,r, 'l'hr2y do not 
f nd go ls Lo u [ul 
c ~) nc er ts Lore t.11 a 
Dpp11es to or can they 
i,i nt:'t Iy v1iti1 w JlY ,.,xi::ter,ti,:11 em only 
a BL ,1.:n d ;;1aint n nc of an 
aiJihropocent ic o.i. Hurld, (' . ,>arr: r , l II 
p ti ulnr, not hcun iielptul to 'Onc:L1Ialion, by 
hl:1 i:asJt_:teHce i an all-or 
affair !H2 long:i ng so 2ly to Thi 
over1oo 1':s Lf.ie po::;s1_1n.JJ_ty tl, t thee rnHy l> co ntinu urn 
or coni3cious,1ess both in the an Lnal vrnrlLt • within a 
developing and j_ n human adult at ny given 
tin1e Q 
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Fault lies both with the positivist psychologists, 
who have not allo a rule for consciousn ss, and with 
the exii:tentia1ists and humanists, who, motivated by a. 
de ire to remove man a little from tl1e world of 
manipulable objects, have put h:i.1n ttt too at a remove 
f r om n at u r e • Tb i s i s t o o v r El i :>1 p 1 i f y t. It c s e t o s o me 
xtent 1 t s an overvi this cha ct ri ion is, I 
believe, v lid. 
an a t t e11c pt to l-l gy_ on irica1 
_foundations, \'i Lon el cted to ignore the concepts of 
mind an<l con ci u sine,: t:bey la.ck d e planat.ory 
us fulness, i11 J.1ir3 vie Skinn0r argue along the same 
1 l n es • The en vi r o m:i n L c t .:::: upon t ha ind iv id u a 1 so a s to 
elicit a r span e \4betlte or n.oL th'is re ponse is 
incor po at ll in to U1e individual' r p rt.oire J_s a. 
matter of its consequences for _,., I-. t .. J.l individual; its 
reinforcement value Thus tL1e individual is essentially 
a 1iassiv r cjpi nt oJ.:. envirow1ental stimuli, and there 
is 1itt1c, t.;r no conception of tht:~ hurnan as a li.ving 
being, who i inherently giv n Lo a tively e ploring, 
• . ! • avoioing , l . a.no c urng :Lng his world. It rnay he considered 
that activene~s does not iwply a conscious purpose. 
Tlierefore tbe notion of consci.ousnc3SS could be disposed 
of with no loss of predictive or explanatory power. The 
existc~ntialists utterly deny this. Man is 
distinguishable due to this very characteristic. 
Consciousness is not simply awareness but the ability to 
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have knowledge of oneself as a distinct entity, to be 
the subject at the centre of a world of experience. 
Notions such as activeness are implied in purpose, in 
particular, and in existential views in general 
(although existentialists confine themselves to the 
human realm.) 
The positivist approach, which is clearly 
variation on Descartes' formulation, is to assume no 
consciousness at the animal level, and to ignore it at 
the human level (since a moment of reflection would 
negate the possibility of denying it altogether). If 
consciousness or the nebulous cognitive component is 
allowed at the human level, this is identified with the 
action of neurons, and is said, in principle, to be 
reducible to S-R units, and therefore determinable. I 
will not repeat (Popper's) previous arguments contra 
determinism. 
Koestler (1978) marshalls a great deal of support 
for his nnt-tnn of an hierarchy of 
consciousness, which overcomes the stumbling block of an 
all-or-nothing concept of consciousness. His formulation 
is roughly this: consciousness is a matter of degree, 
which ranges, for instance, from deep sleep to dreams, 
to habitual (although sometimes complex) actions, to 
highly attentive awareness, to consciousness of our own 
awareness, and so forth. The 11 routinization 11 of familiar 
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skills means that such operations need not be 
accompanied by any great degree of consciousness, and is 
obviously of parsimonious value, but tends to turn us 
into automata :i.f not held in check. quantum leaps may 
be made fron one level of consciousness to another, 




realisation that we have been "asleep". There is no 
clear mind/body boundary as Descartes held. The 
conceptual dichotomy of body as Democritean or Newtonian 
matter (matter itself has been de-materialised by modern 
physics) and mind as a sort of ethereal something, is 
regarded by Koestler as having a highly negative 
influence over psychological and other theorising. 
Koestler's approach implies "a pluralistic instead 
of a dualistic view. The transformation of physical 
events into mental events, and vice versa, is effected 
not by a single leap over a single barrier, but by a 
whole series of steps up or down through the swing-gates 
of the multi~levelle<l hierarchy." l"Ie uses the 
examples of hearing (upward) and speech (downward) to 
explain this hierarchical structure. "Mental" and 
11 mechanical 11 are aspects which accompany actions at all 
levels of the hierarchy. The concept of complementarity 
from physics is taken as an analogy. This stems from the 
observation that the so-called elementary particles 
sometimes act like solid points of matter and sometimes 
6 'J ,) 
as waves, depending on the experimental arrangement. (It 
should also be mentoned that in such matter-waves there 
is no material which "waves''• Koestler compares this to 
the vibration of a string in the absence of the string.) 
Koestler's comments on consciousness also have 
implications for free will, which, 
is not an all-or-nothing affair, 
like consciousness, 
but is a matter of 
degree. The greater the degree of conscious awareness, 
the greater the degrees of freedom available. 
Determinism is seen to be untenable, not only at the 
quantum level, but also at the macro-level of human 
activity, where consciousness ever recedes before its 
own grasp. 
At times we are capable of acting almost like 
automata~ completely controlled by the contingencies of 
the environment. Skinner, especially, draws from this 
the unwarranted conclusion that all behaviour, and all 
human behaviour, is thus characterised. It may be said 
that this is unfair and that Skinner merely sees his 
methods as the most apposite way to characterise human 
behaviour. It is undeniable, however, that Skinner 
(a) does not see the relevance of c6nsciousness to the 
explanation of human behaviour; and 
(b) in his scientific writings and models he maintains a 
strictly behavioural point of view which admits of no 
exceptions. It is almost an article of faith for Skinner 
and his adherents that given all relevant historical 
data the prediction and control of behaviour is 
possible. 
The human ability, stemming from the mode of self-
conscious being, allows us, in the existential 
formulation, to perceive a greater number of "worlds" 
than are supposed by theories and practices which ignore 
consciousness. This is quite compatible with Koestler's 
hierarchical notions, although some existential writers 
(Sartre in particular) have maintained views of 
consciousness not wholly reconcilable with Koestler's 
fluid formulation. The imaginative capacity takes the 
human sphere of action far beyond what is given, 
although contingency can never be entirely severed. 
While certain contingencies may be severed, man is 
always in-the world. This is an e11during theme of 
existentialism, and is often overlooked by critics, who 
charge that he e istential p ychologists have abandoned 
scientific and empirical practices in favor of some sort 
of idealistic humanism that sees man as the measure of 
all things. This is not the case. It has been the 
existentialists' aim since Kierkegaard to examine what 
it rneans to be a human, 
knowledge. 
and what it means to have this 
In the area of consciousness, the formulations of 
phenomenology are vital to the existentialists. 
find their way into existentialism via Husserl, 
These 
and his 
one-time pupil, Heidegger. Husserl sought, somewhat iu 
the manner of Descartes, to establish a number of 
"unassailable truths", (9) by the phenomenological 
method. This consists in the direct apprehension of 
things, iibefore the process of conceptual thought or 
reconstruction via personal constructs sets in. A type 
of primordial contact with the world." (10) Central to 
this process is intentionality, which states tha.t 
conscious acts do not merely take place in the head, but 
are directed to the outer world of objects - are 
inextricably linked to them. 
As \Jarnock (1967) points out, the existentialists 
have taken up the idea of intentionality and the method 
of phenomenology, 
understanding and 
which insists on an 
description of the 
intuitive 
primordial 
experiences upon which all other knowledge of the world 
is based. However, Husserl's attempts to establish a 
base of unassailable truths are rejected by the 
existentialists. They see intentionality as a conceptual 
tool capable of undercutting the Cartesian 
subject/object dichotomy. Merleau-Ponty is a case in 
point. He is careful to emphasise the role of what is 
normally taken as the observer, while allowing that the 
"object" world exerts a strong influence. He has been 
critical of the phenomenologists for, what he sees as, 
the over-emphasis on the role of the subject. In the 
area of perception, phenomenology has, he claims, been 
guilty of a subjectivism which denies that one could he 
in error about one's own perceJJtions. Obviously one can. 
For Heidegger, phenomenology provided the tools 
with which he could undertake his study of Being. He saw 
phenomenology as a method for 11 uncovering 11 , 
what is, be seen. 11 :3ecause phenomena, in the 
phenomenological understanding are always just what 
constitute Being, and furthermore because Being is 
a ys the Being of beings, we must first of all bring 
beings themselves forward in the r:l.ght way, if we are to 
have any prospect of exposing Being. These beings must 
likewise show themselves in the way of access that 
genuinely belongs to them. 11 (11) Phenorneno1ogy was the 
correct way, according to Heidegger, to "bring beings 
forward. 11 
Edwin Boring (1963) considers that the 
behaviourists' rejection of consciousness was a case of 
11 t.hrowing the baby out with the bathwater." He objects 
to dualist formulations of mind and body since they get 
us no further than behaviourism (which ignored mind) or 
introspection (which ignored body). He asserts that "the 
correlation between consciousness and events in the 
brain shows no sign of yielding to insight because there 
is no conceivable way in which insights can transcend 
the dualistic gap between rnind and matter." (12) This is 
s i 111 i 1 a r to Koe s t 1 er ' s f o rm u 1 a t hat t he s e 1 f c an never 
succeed in grasping itself entirely. Boring proposes, 
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based on what he sees as its heuristic advantages, an 
identity theory. As regards phemonenology, he rejects 
the contention that there can Le any useful scientific 
significance in the concept of immediate experience. 
nThere in not ever a private meaning to 21 1:::>e1"""' datum, 
except as it is given in relation to some extrinsic 
frame of reference." (13) Now this must imply one of a 
number of things, it seems: (1) Consciousness is always 
consciousness of something. In this case, the 
phenomenological concept of i11tentionality anticipates 
Boring's criticisms; 
(2) Private meaning cannot exist in a scientific sense, 
because to communicate one must rely on the 11 extrinsic 11 , 
shared, patterns of meaning and communication. 
Although Boring is critical of behaviouris,n, he invokes 
one of its principal dictates in his critique of 
ph nomenology, namely that of public communicability and 
verification, Koch has cJearly pointed out the dead-end 
to which such requirements lead. Scientific advances 
have been made by individuals who have, at first, been 
unable to place their findings in the context of a 
wholly understood "extrinsic frame of reference." Koch's 
notion of "language pools" captures the meaning of the 
fact that very often the procedures and implications of 
science are understood by very few people - only those 
that have immersed themselves in the language of the 
particular group. 
"space is curved"? 
Who, even now, understands the phrase 
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(3) If Boring means that our private experience can 
never be accurately articulated, that is, existentially, 
because we rely on essentialist, symbolic means of 
communication, then his preference for a mind/body 
identification seems paradoxical. However some 
existentialists would agree that he is correct on this 
point, Sartre especially. He developed whole works, for 
example 11 Nausea 11 , on the theme that experience can never 
be captured. We cannot 11 become 11 what we are exJJeriencing 
- consciousness, as he perceives it, tears us away 
continually from what is. Boring does not deny, I think, 
direct experience. \!hat he does deny is that this direct 
experience can ever be communicated nas it is 11 , since 
comr,rnnication, he implies, involves the use of symbols 
and concepts, which can never be anything more than the 
shadows of the original experience. This overlooks tl1e 
possibility of a commonly shared mode of "opening out 
onto the world", as Merleau-Ponty would have it, which 
we possess by virtue of our inherited means of 
apprehending the world. The fact that language may only 
imperfectly characterize experience does not cut us off 
from our fellow humans. I may "know what you mean" even 
though 11 it 11 hasn't been clearly set forth in symbolic 
terms. The continual development of itlio@s and slang in 
language seems to reflect the realisation that new 
experiences need new symbols to communicate them. 
G9 
People who arE, 11 en rapport" may communicate by wlrnt 
appears to be the scantiest use of language Boring's 
point is well ir1ade 1 as regards the difficulty of 
existential co1111trnnicat:lon 1 however, there seer,1s no point 
in ruling ont -- ,C Ul. court tl1e of 
experience, merely because it presents difficulties of 
characterisation, or because it is only open to 
approxinations which can never be perfected. Science 
itself, Popper maintains, is always incomplete Direct 
experience should not be denied a place in onr 
calculations, merely because it resists all attempts to 
perfectly and finally symbolise it 
For Skinner, the goal of psychology is the 
prediction and control of behaviour. He reduces motives, 
rc~asons, goRls and so forth to the datum of 
reinforcement-stimulus history. If this history is 
unknown, he says, then we can have no idea what a 
person's mental state may be, and have no r:ir,ht to rnake 
guesses or inferences as to vrilat it n1ight be@ Asking the 
person is not scientifically valid, in the 
behaviouristic conception of scientific methodology 
taken from positivism. Quite apart from the arguments 
counter to positivism, and the fact that most of the 
progenitors have seen fit to radically modify or drop 
their former lines of thinking, there are less technical 
reasons for adrnitting the category of mental states, as 
Savin points out: "Skinner's dismissal of mental 
10 
~,tates thnt are inferred frorn a s11bject 1 s l1istory :ts 
unconvincing. Consider, for a moment, the variety of 
states that on different occasions might figure in 
e2~planations of eating: we may ec1t because we are 
hun~ry, becau::;e \ife don't \}ant to of:f:encl our hn!=!i~pqq, 
because the doctor has ordered us to eat ••• such 
distinctions among states of mind are obviously critical 
for predicting subsequent behaviour - for predicting, 
for example, whether we will stop eating when the 
hostess leaves the room, when the doctor pronounces us 
cured •• 11 (lL}) 
The behaviourist school has attempted to do for the 
environment what Freud did for biology and instinct. 
Suffice to say that their approach has produced some 
useful results. !Iowever, it is obvious that the 
limitations of this perspective are considerable. In 
promising to develop a program and means of prediction 
and control, the behaviourist school, inadvertently or 
otherwise (a) would place psychology on a comparable 
level with the 11 hard 11 sciences, and thus become 
respectable in the scientific community, and (b) provide 
the tool for social and political agencies to bring 
stability in a century when stability is a rather rare 
commodity. Regardless of its degree of theoretical and 
methodological soundness, one gets the impression that 
behaviourism ia clung to more for what it promises than 
for what it has elucidated about humans. One could 
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compare thircJ to the status of the theory of evolution, 
based sol ly on random mutation and selection by fitness 
There are 11umerous li1,1itations and glaring anomalies in 
the theory, hut its central tenets are upheld, not 
Lc:cause ittJ lea.ding pr·u1;u.11ent.s c:L~l,,c una\·.:are of its 
limitations, Lut because they lack suitable alternative 
th orie • Evolutionary theory provid d a way out of the 
by ascociation, 
social and anthropological theory) by religious dogma. 
Evolutionary theory is not just a picc(, of science, but 
ha :; o b v i o us i H!. po r ta n t soc i a 1 an d c u 1 tu r a 1 i rn p 1 i ca t i on s • 
Even from its inception, some of Darwin's important 
u f.: c ha n is 1,13 we r e £ o u n d t o b e want i n. g , y e t s u c h weak n es s es 
,1ere it:norecl. The reasons were obviou , I tldnk. Once 
ecience had broken free from religion it, quite rightly, 
1,rasn' t willing to put its head back into Uw halter: the 
difficulty is ti-18.t any criticism of the theory may be 
perceived s an attack on the idea of the general 
validity of a scientific description of the development 
o f t he lt um an r a c e • ( Thi :; i s n o t f a r f e t c he cl , a s recent 
events in America have shoirn -~ evolution in schools etc) 
Likewise the criticism of behaviourism, or the attempt 
to introduce mind into psychology, is not an oblique 
attack on the idea of a scientific psycholo1;y. It is 
merely a pointing out that the scientific study of 
behaviour is lacking if it ignores consciousness, and 
the self-awareness capability of individuals. 
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Freud, in a conversation with Ludwig Dinswanger, in 
reply to Binswanger's query as to why Freud had reduced 
man to drives, and left so ljttle rooD1 for 11 spiritn, 
replied that everyone, including he, knew that nan had a 
spiritual di@ension, but that he saw it as his task to 
explicate and investignte the instinctual side of human 
nature. (15) Freud's implication, t t humans are not 
motivated solely by biology, is a somewhat different 
formulation from the bioloeical determinism adopted by 
many of his followers. Thus may theory become dogma. It 
is not <loubted that the environment (rightly or wrongly 
charncterised ns 11 out there") plays an important and 
some t ir!les dominant role in forming our actions. 
Behaviourism goes beyond the limits of its abstraction, 
however, when it states we are nothing more than the 
p1:u,sive recipients of environlilental <lirection:c, 
\-Jhite (1967) shows tl1at the explanatory value of 
pl,yc;iological 
explanatio11s 
and other causal (i.e., 
diminishes rapidly when we 
antece<lent) 
consider 
lJelwviou:r describable as 11 actions 11 , rather than as 
11 occurrenc.es 11 or 11 happerdngs 11 • "The same specific 
occurrence - playing the piano - raay, or rnay not, on a 
given occasion~ also be an instance of something 
polyworphoHsly der,cribable as, fore ample, practising 
for a concert, or giving a concert recital, or trying to 
annoy the neighbours: It is obvious that wiiat counts as 
an explanation of so-and-so pertly depends on the 
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description gi ve11 of so•-and-i.::o. \le c H e pla:Ln why a ;iun 
1.,:: play:Ln 6 the piano !Jy sayL1tg th.Gt he is practisinJ, 
but we cannot explain liis practising by saying he is 
p 1 a yin g the piano • " ( 1 C ) J\ n d g a :L n : 11 It i ~, not the 
ub;Jence of some physiological cowponent which malces it 
:Lnpossihlc for rny right haud to gi.v ;,1y left hand a 
it is t e mea in of "present", as 
o;,1 thing that one docs noi: give:) to oneself, that makes 
this impo sible.a exi s tr~:n t ia 1 is ts 
o huuan bein~;,3, a11J the f;:iilure to ak such attributes 
in o account leaJt, to a pa city and shaLLowEet::: that 
woultl prov fatal to psychology. 
Koch, althou~1,h tlwroughly critical of 1J(Jl1aviourisrn, 
re i:; a r d r; t he e i;i b r a c i n g o i: c i s ten t i a l i s t no l:. i on s by 
i' I' o b 1 c, r:1 • Koch ii as the impression that e is t c n ti al ism is 
ft i;1 c tho d anti t l t c: tic 1 to 1,\ pi r i c 1 sci n c e , and 't✓ liich 
lays down u rw u 1J port ab 1 c claims as to how t l1 e v: or J. c1 :u:; , 
i t h o u t a t t e mp t i n g t o v '" r i :f y t iJ e Jil , If that w re true, 
ids obj cLLon oul.J be vre11-founcle<l. He ,,,ra:::: writing at a 
when 0 istentialis was in vogue, thanks to the 
vopularity {' OI th e \Jo r le o o f ~art e rJnd C 11 i 1 they 
r c p e e n t i 1rqJt) .r ta n t t hr e u d r; , they cannot: b said to be 
the whole tapestry. Hor woulu th,::cy tliew::::e1ves, 1 Lhink, 
1,di:b to be SJccn as presenting dogi;tatic acrnertions about 
thif::l or that. Rather, in the tradition of 
existential im11, tiLe:l.r task Has to coutinually question 
the 1H1ture of our syutcms. ~; u c lt ,1 u es ti on :l n g v o u 1 d a 1 f: o 
atldress itself to sciencej witich seeks to answer 
uui,terous ,1ucstio1w of it,1portanc. A retreat into ansuers 
ue scientific, religious or volitical. E x i {; t e n t i a 1 i s m 
s e ,) rn s to a c co r u w i th Po pp er I s vi e ,·r th a t the r c can , from 
our perspective, l..i e n o f i n a 1 a n .s 11 e r s • Our nets>:-: catch 
certain fish, out the gang :L::i too fine or too coarse 
for otlters. Tlic utility of soi11e of the coHccpts of 
ex i :,: ten t i a 1 i s t:1 w i 11 u e e an i n e cl i n the n e x t s e c t i o n , b u t 
it seems upparent, to thic:, w:citer at 1 r.:wt, that the 
attitude thematic direction of 
existentialisw, is of value tu a scientific appraisal of 
r;taH. This incluJes tiHo eliqJlia is wld.ch it place,.:'- on the 
:::;hared E\ttributes of conscH)llt3I!eEu3, etc, and its 
a~:;s(:,rtion of a non-dogitiutic approach to penaissiblo 
questions, an z:1. t 11 nan s \I e .r 11 they :c, up p 1 y. I lay (1959), 
unong others, I1a3 called for • t· a BC].('llce OL by 
w hi c l! it e Ille au s o n e ln.1 a e cl o n t he ( s up po t3 e d 1 y ) unique 
is analogy is taken from Popper (1982). A net of 
infinitely fine gauge would repres,~!nt an otteiq.Jt to 
attain perfect knowledge in the wanner of Laplace's 
demon. Popper gives reasons for the UHattatnahi.1ity of 
such knowledge. 
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clwract1Jric1t:icn of hn1n:1111.1. T\1iH llu11 an ncience ontrasts 
F: v e u r. 1. n n y p e o p 1 <~ \d. t Ji. who rn ii :i u t c n t j_ a LI s n s t r i k e s 
o rae cl10:c d arc h c.:i tan t to a f:J:3c rt tlw.t :LL,: cone ept.s 
pp ar to he 
ostly unt ["!table, ·11y crnpir:l.cal u 11.,.1 , nd Lh efore do 
not 1J lon in th ci.ne cl scientifi. nowledge. 
P pa (19U2) 
Neopolitain philo r who dvocated a 
L1u1nan science~ Po1 1 pa' s elucidatio1J or Vico' ;.: "!.'lt> le seerus 
c tJ p c; c, i 2.1 11 y p t J n '/ l. t r c g r1 r d i. n the {c 1 a t i a n ,0dl:i. p s o f 
0 1 te1,tialif;1Jq :1nd sc:i rice TL lto ld b u1J d that 
tltere p_pearr:i to 1ie no clit1c.ernib1e liJtk bct•.1ecu Vi.co and 
t J 1 c 1 t t~ r xi 0 tent in 1 \l it r i:~ 1) Vic 1u :a.int c,;. i .. 11 i.J L l 1 at : 
( ) 0 1.~n o·t1l e <l :,.i Or l1 uu1.a ~l C OU 1 d 1) thoruughgoing 
our k11ot'l1 rl 1~~e C'.' ·'· t 0 .L L. !l n t,n·nl rld, and 
(I)) to 
(! n t l' ric, t:l 1 no•.r dt; of uh tit s to be 
l1u1na11, lJhic:11. rend r :it:.:~; 1>rodt1 cts 1110:rr: inte11itible th::1.n 
'L- 's.·,. {' ,'.·.,' , .. , () £· ,•·,. 1,.', 1,,,1,, ·.r. 1. y J'l ''l t:' 11 .... '·l ., •.- - i' n Ti C' C, 11 ( ·1 ';" ) 'J'' l l ~ . _ . <- .. ,.1 c. __ ,, L. ,.. ,.. ... ) • ;ro c lairas 
Ii,, rlid no SC s incoF1p ti bl Tilus e D eks to 
introduce, us sci ntific dut , whut wold normally be 
b rd as ur ly r;u1Jjecti.vc k1i_o,,1l 
n t cc de 11 t kn o 111 c C: <..if ul,ic Vico ,Jpcaks is 
gained through being human. For example, with the 
progressive development of cognitive and other 
capacities from infancy to adulthood, Vico successively 
7 (j 
antl non~:r.at:i.onal 
Ueings, semi-rational but cxc ,.:cJiv 1y lit ral··•rn:i.n<lcd 
a n d f i 1w 11 y J ratio11 1 heiu 0 s cap ble of 
tlli,, 11t,J.y lJ hn over-ElirnpliLLcctti.on of iutcll ctu.nl und 
uwotional u eve l o JJ uw n t , 
t, i k. e t 11 e e :x: i r., t e r1 i a 1 i s ts , ay s t11a t h.u111<-~1n 1.::noi:vle d ge 
oI tit al.Juve, f O r (~ X ,LH p 1 C , :i.:; a.cqu:tr cl through the 
o.lJility to self \le li e sorn :i.ns:t1)1t in to the 
intellectual dcvelopiilent oL liLLlfrlll becau,ie 1:r ii.re lnunan 
I n r i~ s po 11 s :~ t o t ht~ a r 2, u. n i; t h t. s u c h k no ti l e d t e i s 
;10 t scient:i.f ically u,lrcli,:i si b 1 e, Pompa point out that 
science its lf does not accc.:::pt 11 accountc., 0£ human 
uerwviour au dy_ually credi!Jlc, ulttwugh thy ;.nay fulfill 
criteria 0£ being o\Jjcictive and e .:t p :i. r :i. ca 11 y 
[ulsifiablto:, look only for certain types of 
ex9L11w t ionu. n 'f h u t1 a c r t i u c o ll c 11 t i o u o f t h e k i n cl o f 
ex9lanation LiJJprop:riate to c1 l.tuuan cien.ce underlies the 
p r a c t i c e o f s o c i a 1 s c i en t i s t s • 11 ( 1 9 ) Po ,n pa c 1 a :i. rn s that 
social scientists, historians anJ psychologists, it 
could be suid, d o no t e 1,1 p 1 o y nw r e l y arbi tn1 ry 
definitious of mun, in their theories and exp1nnations. 
1{atliur, tilcy aln.:ady have :some :LlQa of vilrnt it Ls they 
wish to expluin, au<l wliu.t sort of answer is intelllgible 
for the question they have asked. Tllif3 prior idcn iri the 
antecedent knowledge of wLich Vieu speaks. 
17 
.!\ h u 1.1 d n G c i n c '" Ho u 1 d a t t E: 11 p t t o c o L!. c h its 
i. 11 LC1' 1ll 
, .. 
(JJ.: c!wruct ri,it:Lcu ,,.,rlt:l.ch are 
co rton and uHJqu t O / l U 1,,C! D • on tlw drr1L;sibil:ity 
(l on .:ould Lher fore be able 
tu thnt ilUEJ ,J \/OU1d self=-
11[_: .l ouc;11e ti, C :C tivity, ud so on, 
L nccp u 1 tool 'll 11 Vico' claim is 
t};:l_[J: t)J; .-, C Q pe:it :J on onr 
c c e p t on 3 o \'J' hr: t i t i t. o e h a natural 
owledge. 
1) fi1iitiuus J .c quit·ed, but 
u.. t L : : y o n 1 y t Ji e p u 1" 1 y or;na l a Hd logical 
l1 f u ~c Lt c; r c. o di ti o ~~ r c ti u i .c , 1.!. by 
con epi: o i~ natural r1 ic:.u c La ;.,; ope;rates 
u11d [ (' L r c:; t :c i c t i u 11. ;, t l w n n in1 , "a ll 23 c i n c but it 
p y:c: Ctt,.: i'..:i nd of 
l c1li~~i.bi1 tJ can truly 
( 2 ()) 
J'\uy C ·1 I . .L.!.... of i! rg1.1n1ents 
j :LI:tr Lo ;;01;1 ulr ady ucintion cl. ;w useful 
0 1) C V (.~ t. ~i O n t. ; l c; L Lt c n :J :i 111 p 1 c can only l> c u 11 1· stood in 
L o.C L1 • 11 (21) of the 
nion o If :3 the whole, 
gestalt of his biological and ,:;oc i al conditions and 
their cffect::1. Thus ma.n, as r,1an, relates to the world 
tl1rough his s(clf-consciousriess. This is the cdgenwclt 
("I world") of which more mention shall be made below. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXISTENTIALISM: SOllE KEY CONCEPTS 
In this section some of the key concepts of 
existentialism will be examined, especially as they 
relate to the practice of existential psychotherapy. 
Just as many of the wrj.ters labelled as 
existentialists seem to have little in common bar a 
propensity to ask ontological questions, so too the 
therapists and psychologists of existentialism often 
bear little resemblance to each other. Ellenberger (1) 
makes a distinction between (1) Philosophical 
existentialism, which considers man's 
experience; (2) Existential psychology, 
immediate 
which was 
inspired by Heidegger, and which applies existential 
principles (i.e., ontological assumptions for the most 
pert) without regard to phenomenology or psychoanalysis; 
and (3) Binswanger 1 s Daseinanalysis, which is a 
synthesis of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and 
existential concepts. It is apparent, then, that given 
this single consideration of Ellenberger's above, the 
rubric "existential psychologist 11 or therapist may count 
for numerous styles and approaches to counselling. It is 
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also apparent that the existentialists have managed to 
become aligned with the so-called Third Force Movement 
in psychology. This principally a humanist viewpoint 
identified with such people as Maslow, Rogers and 
others. Although there is some resemblance between 
existentialism and this humanism, they are not identical 
by any means. They converge most where they speak of the 
uniqueness and worthwhileness of the individual, who is 
not to be treated as a simple collection of drives and 
impulses, nor as some statistical datum, an<l they 
diverge most where the usefulness of the natural science 
approach to human behaviour is examined. While Maslow 
may distance himself from behaviourism or 
psychoanalysis, his is still, basically, an objectifying 
technique. His desire is to discern essences, that is, 
traits, abilities and the like which make individuals 
what they are. The existentialists, on the other hand, 
are only concerned with what it is like to be human in 
general, and this or that human in particular. 
To illustrate the way in whicl1 the existentialists 
conceive of particular psychological conditions, the 
concepts of anxiety and freedom will be examined from an 
existential perspective. 
BO 
A N X I E T Y 
As has already been mentioned, anxiety, according 
to tl!e existentialists is an ontological category 
arising fro1n the fact that since ilu1nans l1ave the ability 
to reflect on their own being, they are also able to 
conceive of their absence - their non-being or death. 
This lends to life a quality which one may compare to 
that derived fro!il hanging off the side of a mountain, as 
opposed to '. reauing about it. In fact, the 
existentialists maintain that lack of tl1is balancing 
feeling, of the nearness of death, is indicative of a 
d liberate misunderstanding or distorting of one's 
co1Hlition as a human. ilurna.n time is lim:Lte<l. Thus, if 
e..nytld.11.:~ is to Le completed to our satisfaction, it 
cannot be delayed forever. 
Fear of death or anxiety about it are not to be 
taken as in any way abnormal. On the contrary, they stem 
from the correct understanding of the human situation. 
Various existential psychologists and psychiatrists have 
used this basic framework of anxiety to try to explain 
or understand various manifestations of abnormal or 
self-defeating anxiety. Ontological anxiety, in Laingian 
terms, for instance, refers to anxiety about one's own 
being, one's own identity. Laing observes that the 
ontolocically insecure person "may feel more unreal than 
real" and only "precariously differentiated from the 
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rest of the world." (2) One aees shades of Sartre, who 
Laing acknowledges as a deep influence, in these 
descriptions. The consequence of this ontological 
insecurity for the individual is that his mode of being 
-the way he commerces with the rest of the and 
other people in particular - is radically altered. Most 
importantly, he experiences other people and situations 
threatening rather than gratifying. rl . .l .lS tenuous hold 
on an identity is continually challenged by others. 
ilence llis life :1.s reduced to a t3truggle to maintain a 
semblance of an idea of self. Tl1e individual acts from a 
ltighly unstable base, and uost of ;1is ener8y LJ devoted 
to shelv:Lng up thiB crumbling cJ<lif:i.ce, rather thau 
de v e 1 o ping any c re a t iv e or s a ti s f yin g r e 1 a t ions id p w i t h 
the world and others. This type of individual ha:::J bfJen 
-.rc:11-portrayed in ttH~ fi.lin of Kurt Vonnegut's novel 
11 S laughter hons e Five ti, in tlw charac te :t Paul Laz:,3a ro. 
unstabl sens of Ids own identity is 
betray,~d by his continual aggression in the face of 
imagined insults and betrayals. The insecurity 
experiences concernin3 his own existence leatls hiru to be 
excessively sensitive about the correct spelling of his 
name, for instance. He finally atternpts to achieve a 
measure r 0 .. : identity by an act of notoriety, 
killing of a public figure, who, imagines, 
namely tlie 
killed ' . fl 1. s 
best, he would li.ke to imagine, friend, by treadin3 on 






Kemp (3) point::; out that most counselling 
psycl1ologists distinguish normal from neurotic anxiety. 
'1'he latter ia differentiated frorn norrnal anxiety in that 
it is tlicp:co;µortionate to the oujective threat, and may 
involve intra-psychic conflict, and 
managelu(::!llt Ly means of aggression, inhibition, symptom 
formatio:ti etc, and a retrenchment of anxiety and 
awareness. The existentialists ta for granted an 
ontological anxiety that arises from a realisation of 
o;w I s l:initude Tillich, according to Kemp (1971), sees 
exist2nticil anxiety a::; Liasic to all other forras of 
anxiety. Ln any anxiety-provoking situation, i1e says 9 it 
is the threat to one's own being which is the 
frightening factor. Anxiety as a conflict bet\/een being 
and non-bein3, is also inherent in change. The 
presentation of new possihilit:Les rnay Lie experienced as 
threatening to present security since they involve 
letting go of what one already has, even if this is not 
particularly gratifying. Better the devil we know, as 
the saying goes. While some make a sharp distinction 
between existential and neurotic anxiety, Tillich, at 
least, sees neurotic forws as base<l on the ontological 
form. In this caset neurotic behaviour is essentially an 
attempted escape from an all-pervasive anxiety into 
illusions of stability. Laing's conception of the 
schizoid individual, as that person experiences l1imself, 
is one of chronic anxiety over his own being. Thus, the 
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be l.1 av i our of the person , \'/hi 1 e objective 1 y 1 a be 11 e d as 
1\,1ad 11 is not inconsistent with his view of the world. 
The behaviour of such an individual may be bizarre, but 
it. does have its own rules. Laint1, iu not making the 
a s 0 er t i o r1 t 11 at t he s o - ca 11 e d 11 d e rang e d n ind iv i. d u a 1 s have 
any better insight into themselves or others or life in 
general than the rest of us. Rather, he is saying that 
their actions l1ave meaning given that they view the 
world in a certain way 
For Laing, tlie fact that dnatil br:Lngr_; an abrupt 
end to all ende vours, ic lititigatecl soi,1ewhat by 
0 ll t. 0 1 o t; :L C a l G C: C U r i t y , It is not uo liacl to l:no that one 
will die, provided that while one is alive one can act 
::::pontaneously and freely in the sure kn 
011:n exi:::;tence ancl 1rorth. Tlie \rore:;t that can befall a 
person i::.1 t to be a were chimora, 
never really experiencing the div rsity of life, since 
he is buy buil<lins wulls, ithin which to protect his 
threatened identity, 
Laing describes three types of anxiety experienced 
by the ontologically insecure person: 
(A) n•rc'ULV'""'"rl'l1 II A f. n il · .L'l'1l~-' : 1t irrn S(:'DSe of one's own autonomous 
identity is required in order that one may relate as one 
human being to another. Otherwise any and every 
relationship threatens the individual with loss of 
identity." (1:-) The individual fears that a relationship 
,Jill en ,rnlf 
'-' 
and destroy hi::; tenuous identity. 
11 En;;ulfw.12nt L, felt as a risL in being undenitoo<l ( thus 
co 1;1 pre Ji en cl e d ) , in being loved, or even simply 
in oeing seen. 11 (5) Isolation is likely to be employed 
as a defenc a 0 nirn;i~ tl.1reut of (~nguJfnc,11t One can see 
again the effect of Sartre on ing 1 s thought. Sartre 
asserted thut there is a l1uman tendency to objectify 
others in terms of e r o 1 e t 11 y p 1 a y , an d t h us , i n s om e 
1neasure ;1 t o r e d ti c t h e Ht t o t t r o 1 e • The defensive 
reaction of the ontologicMlly i:1 ecu e per on threatened 
\Ii t J 1 e 11 L~ ti 1 f 1:1 11 t ~l. ;3 l) l .. -~ ps HD ur1co1J~; iou,..: reuliuation of 
thin.JI 
recogni::eD tlrnt uny role oth :r Ui.ar tit<: one lw choose::; 
for binsclf :Ls likely to ove:cuheL.1 l1:it11. 
Ii!PLOSION: T to l,e 
er,1pty. 
c -cu sh any id.entity J.1 e 11 ~J ;;; 'J1 i1 u ~~: , any co r, ta c t w i th 
reality is f aretl. 
C person 
identity. 1Tl1e 1Jer;son :Ls 1it:or 11y 
contact with otller pc~op1 Iu cout rist to hi.s O"'rln 
n e h u l o us p er c e p t i on s of .s e 1 f :i ,J en t I t y , 
experiences others as too real; 
I1ai 1.1g not delve into 
questions of causation. And it is not intended hcff(::! to 
discuss such matters. Hin bins towards an existential 
interpretation of schizophrenic and 11syclwt:Lc (~xperience 
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ster,rn frorn his belief that tld.s :ui u rite thod for 
and that 
it tloes oot raiE!lc up bet11ee11 Llte iud:Lvitlual an<l the 
t Lera p :i. r:c t an i 11 vi;:;; i IJ 1 e ll arr j_ er of t b or y • Th Lherapist 
i :::; not con iJ tr ei. inc (I to p 1 ace th cl :L u t u n t 11 e proverb i a 1 
L1 e pendent <J n co n1 mull i cation _[or :i t ci s u cc ,;; s , and if the 
participants can find no common wav length, then the 
L Ing rn8kes Jt cl(?~1r that 
ccepting tl! P-k1tieI1t' s i G t C TJ. t 1 [J 1 e ::i. .P (!rt(~ )l C (~ i. s n O t 
tl1e f3CtJ-l(~ HU V(l1i(1::.ttin~~ 1t (,l,G TlOf']1\Gl or h(;a1thy@ rrhe 
ur:icfnln :\ ;; t ; I. t i /J ] often 
u J. ~: n r r {; 0 nonsensical 
h 11 viour of psychotic or cl1izop~1:r nic ind:1v:l•:lunls :ls 
pl Cd in COI!t,.~ of the Otlll 
th i own ' lie,? 
·:·10 ld and nd l1u\\.r t110] sb.ou1d 
th :c,3:for act, 
( •: t"·• t_), -; :;, j 19CJ0), ,,.:1tl1. othi:.;rt'.) such ns 
C ll S;; be1:I.21ve th t we 1 i V(; J.n r1n 
!1 de i not ouly the oflto1o ic:11 an :i1.,ty n cndercd by 
knowled e of our condition, but i:tn anxiety arising from 
t{n in1p0ver:i,:3hin nt of 1ife (.1nd. rc~1r::tionsh1pGtl 
be,?n lost in tht: capac:.Lty to experie ce and have faith 
Jn oneself n worthy and unique ' l!{l 
time the capacity for faith in snd weaningfu1 
communication with other selves, namely our fellow men, 11 
(6) It is pos8ible, of course, that man has so 
s u c c e [1 f: f u 11 y r i cl h i m s e: l f o f l t :L :3 i 11 u fl i o n s t h n t h e ma y , 
quite correctly, s e e li i ni s ed. f a s w or t h 1 es s , one among 
p1.illions, and hi;; cornmunicntio11 ,H:J (;enerally banal. This 
:Ls r.:1 vc:,luc:: jurJ;_~CJ!tcnt, o :f c our s u , b u t i t Pl u :; t b e n 11 owe cl 
the ti. uc· ns tliat accorded ' ~ - ~-u i.: u c: r such judgep1entr1, 
Jikr May's, wh:Lcli as ert that wan is 11orthy, un:Lque, and 
::,o on. C:i.veu thGt m1ch diverging vnlur2s can be ascribed 
to life, it hc•coH a p pa c n t t hat 1 i f c ' s rn e u 11:L n r; i s no t 
3lve:n; but it:.!. derived fro i.tc: 1110Ue of eL~.r;cutio:aQ It is 
hou you de) it th:. 1 t counts. ifr,y quotes Tillich (7) to the 
:f f c t t h a L p c .i : 1. c:L u 11 y t ; 1 t Lt a t f n o L H i s t h c 
thr at of r(ci 1:ir,::Jtion of the anin lessness of one's 
existence. l,J.gn c n fiHd a. r .. G on for the exist_ence of 
touls for their utility, 0,nix;,als for the 
function they fulf:111 in tli.e ecological c3ystem, bt1,t he 
i s u n n b 1 e t O f i n tl a n u De qu i VO Ca 1 r 'ce a s O ll f Or !! i lH s e..1 f •· * 
* It is re f1onable to astlHH!.e that many or most 
do not feel confri::inted at all times by 
life's meaning. The universality of the 
the que;-;; tid1n ic,Jf 
I 
\ 
existent:La1J,st 1 :~. 
assertions re~arJing n iety wold 3 cm open to doubt. 
Their not entir ly satisfactory rejoinder would be ~hat 
awareness of the true liurnan contLition (f:lnitud"!, de.nth 
etc.) l. <.• D s e 1 f - d ,~ c e p t i o u 1 t: ohviou::, that tl1e 
. t t. ] . t exis en -1.F:1. ~:1.s s have C(~rtain ideas of what c.onst:Ltut;ps 
true human modes of oxJstencc, and that they could not 
or would not deny that the:l r t hinld ng in value-laden. 
" ••• 1t1ental t;y1;.pto11,n nre CJ.t ti1nu Loth the 
e:: pr 0 f3 c; ion o I nn icty and the uc)tHID of 
it :l (I \ t c.: LOI'IilS l. ,, ,:; 
not a1ou.c, t.i.1crcfor· w l 1 0 n t t c y n r, E; c rt that au :l r:: t y :t E: 
comr,1on to <:111 h11:aan • 11owever, 
f!l.tl. ill t 8. i D 8 tl, t tL cl a:c i fc:r.cn hetween 
h lthy and rly 11 uyc110log:i.cal 
ct:uc pttJ of· an iety :tn CU1;\il!Oll and 
~;ulli van thi,:J thut i Ly is t:i.e<l 
,·.r it h inn r: n ccept iil 
r li n;.; licit th lH,C tatiox1 
of lod of lovr:J or p_p ov 1, o of iJ 1 lj ]_ I\ t ' I! 
If it i L 1( c n L h t one 1 s p ,, •• 1 ,~· oE If: .J .in part 
.c,,flection of love 'j U.J.lU a l; ·r· () ,1 ~ 1 1 
oth(~r::1, n.ny uc1·1 100::J c 11 1Jt.: r;eE)n Ct}J tllf.'' C ;1t: Lo 
t:i 1L1t , iu tli 11 v,: J't(::rcly 
idencd th c:c.or, of nn i ty. 
/iltbou~;l.1 Ti1licl, ic: of tl1 o::L1., 0•1 t 
of no -b ir: is t tl;,e h t of 11 
first dont,tful t 
s y, an;,iety over rin c:.th1 tic p rfori,u,,uc. Tlir,~2~t to the 




0U1c:cs, aud oLhe:c iaflucncc'S, iio;:;t ,,,ysticrJl vrrit: rs holcl 
i.:.lut L e g u i ~:; ;-;, n i 11 us or y n n cl c o n f in in g ll! e J i um o :f: 
c u \!!iii uni cu t i o l! •:Ji ;.; h t li e \tu :c 1 d ·· i t: in.Clu nee on th 
I10 1 .. 1 ver, CLt u.n o L. hu 
·1.'(1erefore, OH one's 
i.deas bout one elf to Slusher 
(1 ,.,--) ':Jul aBB rts t t nxiety d velops from an for ego 
fu1fillt,Hc!nt, nd oclf-realis tion. It dos not orne f rorn 
the situation as it is. sports 
reJ.atL'd dil i ty, ' , ' \J H {;: r C t. 11 :r i JJttlc: ri:Jk of dmnage, 
i~•.11t b kill d. If tt, body 
,:.,1 f e, t i0 Li.1. I) rson l• c: ,_, 
n iou v e ~) t c re r.:o ly, to 1i :in tnc t 
/I hich h::: 
l: o ' .' n:ut, rCli.u L> 'J' i 11 i c h t ;:3 
a ,, rtion tltat 11 ic·ty r OT 
Ct;Ll80.<l 1,1 0,1..\2 ~ 
ontologic2l unxiety, and the 
e iste t:i. 1 1)0 :ition L1 C () Id t; [l 1 j_ t t 1 e di r l. Cu 1 t to 
ccur cy. tl1cre 1 for 
exawple, ncur0Lic H j_ Ly 9 in the 
<:>xistential vie, 2;iven tliat 'f:Lllich;: {:fl an :L::,Ly as the 
tllr at of tlu.,~ key to the 
distinction lies in the unstated i<len that it is the 
socially derived ego, auc1 the etten1pttJ to preserve~ anc1 
bolster it, ubich constitute11 neurotic bc:hr.1viuur. 
l[curotic ;:,,n icty ,,101tld Llic~i~i be: s eu uc; uuL1. ty uve:r the 
prot<:,ctJon of 1 c;. r ge ly an ,l relative 
Luing n :Lcty u i~ r o E tJ. 1 t J_ 11 G threat 
to t(1c: f_: n,s f ider1Lity UI' :f' c, y C Li. 0 t i C Or 
• • ~ 1 
sc!.i.:tzo:tll 0. 
c<:}nntunt t !l ii L i.d.eutit'], l, (j l: h Ci unusual 
b haviour c,niJ orlll vi 8 r t teHtpt Lo lfWintain 
i n t c_: :; r i t y [ . .:en in;; 1rhat th,::y oulc1 
1 :L !). n r LL[ 0 ·,1 
\\' ]12 r I CJ.> ,:;:c their 
:t y ' on t 0 !l C l• i. 
not i Lh () b i L i,,harply 
u :l :; , i :c c d I r u H i i:: :l lly L' tility, 
b \.ti: i I! :L t 1 Li 'I t' 
the ·1 p {J (I 0 [: ' d. U ocL l i.::ati n. 
AJ1. Jc~ty, in 
b ~: ,1 IL :l ;,; no L 
C !l i: i 
conf r () i. 
L :en 1 •.r .• J l.or1 d r:. ly L It O V 1 
t OU J. main 
co uuic tion jtL th t/ {) I~ 1 c( 1 t.hrc ,)· L ,,ucially 
poorly developc(l iclc:1.1r:: of tl1e:i:r 0\✓"'!1 c~K:t tc;11ce i-1 such 
1·1 o u 1 d 
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pleasing their parents (usually) if they actually did 
not exist - had never been born. (' oO while an overly 
contingent sense of II I 11 may ai<l in developing neurotic 
behaviour, it appears that at some stage healthy 
development is dependent on being noticed by others, and 
being accorded positive regard~ Actually, in 
analysis, it is better to be maltreated than to be 
totally ignored. 
Nevertheless, if an individual is made to feel that 
positive regard is dependent on his acting in a 
particular fashion, dressing in a certain way and so on, 
then he lives through his ego. This description would 
just about cover the entire species. But it seems 
reasonable when one considers the vast array of obvious 
and subtle means by which we become conditioned to 
parental and social approval. It can reasonably be 
conjectured that different people undergo diferent 
levels of this socialization, and that those most 
socialised are also most likely to become neurotic 
provided that alternatives to approved behaviour become 
available. It has been speculated that more women than 
men form neuroses, because they are more often expected 
to conform to prescribed patterns of behaviour. They 
cannot 11 bell as they see fit$ Rather, to maintain social 
acceptability, they must fulfill the role patterns 
already laitl down. For example, anorexia nervosa appears 
to represent an extreme attempt to conform to the ideal 
of physical slimness. 
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It seems clear that man does not think of himself 
as just a physical entity. On the contrary, he maintains 
various beliefs and values which are attached to his 
ego. Possible failure to live up to beliefs and 
standards that the person has 1 . auuu1.. hiruself constitute a 
threat to who he thinks he is, or, more precisely, what 
he thinks he is. The inability to see through the 
contingent nature of this acquired ego may lead to 
neurotic anxiety. A distinction is raade between the 
sense of being which is largely spontaneous, and a sense 
of ego, whicla is primarily an acquired set of behaviours 
adapted in response to the expectations of family, peers 
and culture. 
An existential analysis of neurotic anxiety has 
the advantage of elucidating the reasons why a person 
reacts to a situation as if it threatens his being. 'l'o 
him it does. Neurotic anxiety is not objectively valid, 
in that, to an observer, no real threat can be said to 
exist. However, the existential therapists, because they 
concentrate on the lived experience of the individual, 
are bound to consider what the implications of neurotic 
anxiety are. Slusher paraphrases the point made by many 
existential ·writers when he says that "it seems that 
anxiety reappears whenever wan is facetl with living up 
to his potential.'' (11) In the existential schema man is 
intrinsically free, but he must exercise that freedom at 
the price of anxiety. Whenever a ];H2njon is faced with 
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the possibility of being free, a.axiety arises. For a 
person who may be cl1aracterised as overly socialised and 
conforming, the degree and frequency of anxiety is 
abnormally high. Neurotic behaviours are unconscious or 
partly conscious attempts to allay anxiety by conforming 
to behavioural patterns that will put off any decision 
to ma a free choice, or even to avoid the situation 
where a free, and therefore anxiety-provoking choice 
will have to be made. 
Rules and systeH1s of behaviour and Eithics clearly 
diminish l,Jho could drive along a busy 
thoroughfare in the absence of road rules? Religious and 
secular codes of conduct conceivably derive much of 
their appeal from the dirninishrnent of amaety they 
afford. The anxiety arising from free choice does not 
occur when one can believe that there is only one way to 
act, that is, according to the Word. This is not to 
imply that a religious person does not experience 
anxiety. In the case of the believer, his anxiety is 
likely to arise from doubts he has, and his expectation 
that his faith is not sufficiently strong to keep him 
from falling from grace, therby inviting the disapproval 
of the deity, and possibily his fellow believers. 
An existential look at anxiety concentrates on the 
mode of experience of the anxious 11erson * Thus, to 
understand v1hy a person is anxious, it is not 
sufficient, in this view, to be informed only of 
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objective external and physiological conditions. Only 
when it is known how the person construes Ids world can 
his anxiety be understood in anything other than a 
superficial manner. It goes without suying thet self-
reported states of consciousness, beliefs, and physical 
and emotional reactions, are all valued data, ns far as 
an existential analysis is concerned. 
"Man is fref!. This means he cannot he a coward in 
the same way that a table is a table. He may be a coward 
on some particular occasion, but every new occasion that 
presents itself offers him a completely clean sheet, to 
be a cowurd again, or to be a hero. Observe ••• the phrase 
11 be a coward again 11 rather than 11 continue to be a 
coward". Ile may have acted like a coward on every 
occasion yet it is still not true to say he is a coward. 
He is free •••• for in his essence he 1..- ,_ ¥1 • • 4 1 _ nas no q ua1.1. t:.1es, ne 
ju:3t is. 11 (12) In a nutshell, the above is the 
existential position on human freedom. Primarily humans 
are free because they can choose to play any role they 
desire, and need not become bound to any one role. This 
is possibility, not necessarily actuality. However, even 
the possibility needs to be examined. 
Sartre's conception of freedom requires an 
unremitting and almost total self-awareness. It is 
apparent, however, that we only p3.rtin11y achieve this 
state. Han is not totally lucid in respect to himself 
and his motives. Sartre contends thut each person 
choocies to be the way he is and that change is 
erurninently possible~ Han to be how he ·wishes, 
and to inject into any situation his own meaning for 
himsl~lf. 
Merleau-Ponty, unlike Sartre, assumes that human 
freedom is limited in empirical ways. Whereas Sartre, in 
somewhat of an idealist fashion, sees man as condemned 
to beinf.' 
V 
free, and as possessing absolute freedom, 
Mcrleau Ponty insists that man is not an abstraction. 
That is, each individual is free or not free, in regard 
to some concrete situatiou. 11 0ur freedom is thus 
ambiguous. We are neither totally free, nor totally 
unfree, and we nust find out the extent of our freedom 
for ourselves, in interaction with actual situations in 
·which ,,e are placed. 11 ( 13) As has been stated, it is 
considered that Sartre presents an idealised concept of 
freeclor,i. Sartre overlooks the 11 facticityn or 11 throwness 11 
of the human situation, mentioned by Heidegger and 
others. Mot only does our genetic and environmental 
situation help shape our actions, but also the very 
post';ibilities from which a person may choose. 
Sartre holds that humans are free by virtue of 
their self-aware consciousness, whicl1 gives them the 
capability of transcending the immediate situation, of 
en vi fJ n i\ i 11 L w ll a t d o e u ll o t y e t c :L:: t , n 1 n 1 u o vi rq_', t o c re a t e 
In every ilituation Iw has the posr::Lh:i.1ity of 
choo::iin;.; htH/ he 11:i.11 livo, how ll(; 1-rill bt~ in that 
1:::Lt·11ntion. 
,::very ,JitunLion lrns nothing to do Hith playing a role, 
i11 tl1,; S(}I!:.J(: tI1at a11 actor on the stage playci a role. 
act:illg iu one 1rny1 u!lile pos;:.d.bly holding views and 
c no t:L o 1w c on t r a r y t o one 1 s a c !:. c, • S ;;J tr e 1-,0 u 1 d 1 n be 1 th i s 
ha(I fG.i tJ.1 -0 ::a.rtre :H~()J,W to say tlrn.t :i.n any eiven 
,',:ituation OlliJ doc.•:3 not act u 0 ;~rcnuiV(!ly or kindly or 
illustrates Llurtrc 1 s i<lcalistic stuuco. For instance, if 
oHe :Lu aggressive to X on occasion Tl I but cl(?citles to he 
kL1d at '1'2., tiicn sii,iply bc:Lus k:ind 1,1ay not~ be rm simple. 
~i.' h (:: v c :~; L i e i -: 1 l tl 0 L :c (:;~ u s 1. on , t;) l1! o L J,, on r,; , and 
\i! . .:1y pron1otc::: a situation \Il1e:re one 
Lee: u e ii t w i t l ( C O ll L 1 i C t: i ll g !.~ ;n. 0 t i () l! D • It i::.; i.::!ie apparent 
fact thDt 11u1qnn connciouune:3L~ is 1,rnl ti-level 
)) lJ.e\l Ol1l(:'llO ll, that ca D tr; do u lJ ts on t l1 e v a 1 id :i. t y of 
pou:i.tion. ,. · 1 ' r;JJ. f3 LO tnke :into account the 
:i.t18rt:i.uJ 1:ffect:3 of ou,.· corpo:cal:i.Ly. .fll prornot:Lng the 
absoluteness of hurnan freecloin, Sartre sought to 
nnnihilate the Freudian doctrine of b:lolo[_\ical 
detcr1d.H:L;m. \'h:L:., i,1ny expla:iu his tendency to diHallow 
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any notion that our freed om tiny in any way be 
c o !ll p 1 i c a t e cl o r c o rn p r o w. i s e d b y u n c o 11 s c i o us f a c. t o r s • I t 
c1 a y u e said that Sar tr 8 con cc iv es of 111 an "' t hi s best , 
ho 11 he c an tH,i , not IH, cc s sari 1 y ho v, h c is • Th E) fact that 
he it.:; not alwayD nt his best J1ay not, Iurtl1eriuore, 
Lds own fault, in thfi sense thi::.t he :Ls actiiq.:; in bad 
faith. To sny that bad faith is a choice of action 
n e c es s i t at es t b a 'i.: s e 1 f - aw a r n c s s i r: e qua 1 :L n a 11 p e o p 1 e , 
and at all times. 
Hany of our actions hardly reach the level where a. 
conscious decision is 1,1ade to c1ct or not to act. Skills 
once Mastered are hantle<l over to lower levels of 
consciousness, where whole routines Llay be set off by 
one gen e r o.1 i s e d c o .f'l 111 an d • Not only motor or speech 
but also emotions, tnay have sources which are 
f_:carcely discernible, to the Harro•:r focus of 
conscio11.ancss ® One uay still contr,1Hl, us Sartre says, 
tlw t even given th i~uhconsciouL influences, the 
decieion to act is conncious, and that, in the last 
~:c: r th u r 1~ o e s t 1 Qr has 1,,1 r i t t e n a t 1 en g t lt a b o u t th i s 
f a c c: t o f h u .1:u1 n b e ha v i o u. r ~ l!e not.et> thBt the E;reater the 
the lesser t!Hl freedom, 
c>tlthough routJnt::s xn£:.y 11 called 1l p 11 to conscious 
awan:mess by unusual or dangerous or ;,3h0cking situations 
which call for a need to consciously re-appraise routine 
behaviour • 
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consciousness rnay override all previous 
influences. This, however, presents us with the rather 
a 1 s rr,i:L n ;_; s c en a r i o o f c er ta i n p art s of the p er s on a 1 i t y 
coHtend:Lnc witt1 other:3. The social or ethical conscience 
ar.ainst the ewotions, arid so on'! T'hc~ only 1."Iny one may 
lie fr Cf.? l t;I '-' to know the origin of all t. l, (ci forces 
i11tpingiHg upon, and forning what is known as 
consciousness. Thus Sartre's notion of total freedom 
entails a level of self-knowledge which scarcely seems 
posBible. 
The ne:.;ation or denial of freedor:1 in the Sartrean 
schena arisefJ when a person refuses to ecognise reality 
as it :Ls~ What constitutes reality is, and 
ossibly always will be, the subject of interminable 
In Sartre's case, the reality of the human 
r.3ituation ii; r:,urnmed u.p in the ,.1ord Lluman 
e istence is absurd, 
of 
ince it is eventually cn<led by the 
T • r ._,lie cannot be fitted into the 
meaning of soHe gre::i.ter context.. Sartre is an atheist, 
,:1.nd for h.irn thc:re c n be no thought of an r1ft r life, or 
some othPr lar 2;er fra111e of reference, which inay give 
h1u11c:rn life some eaning other t n that which ne takes 
c re to inject into it while it persists. Sartre sees no 
evi nee of 30d, and therefore Mu.st live as if there 
were no god. Existentialism admits of no fictions, 
philosopb.ical, or otherwise. A person must live life how 
and how he sees it must be distinguished 
from how he would like to see it. 
For an individual to cl:,Jihl that he hu::::: to act in 
s u c li n n cl s u c ll a w ,-1 y , £or '1 art: r c , an act of bad 
an inauthentic act, an<l a banic denial of what u 
Eree I) Denial of this 
fr(:ecl.ot:1 often reuu1 ts f roEl t .he a band ou1ue n t 
p :csona1 fra1<1;;) ol: rt~furenc to t.i1at of a role) such cW 
father, or E1an ~ for that matter. A 
calls upon hL11 to do so. 'f h(J valitli ty of ~~artre' s 
aualysi,J i:.i clear, when it coi;ien to pa:3sing the 
te~t of authenticity, ,t e w o u 1 d n 11 f a :L 1 • ',/ e n o t o n 1 y 
a clop t x· o 1 ,". ;:; , bur: ha v e t 11 e 1,t t h :r us t u. po 11 u t; • ll o \J 2 v er I one 
may 1iresU,iiab1y distinguish uegrecs of autl1enticity. 
an cl Uw .Po .s s i bi 1 t y o f f r e r.; do iil , c a r r y ,,1 i t h t h or,1 
the threat of anxiety. D1:~nial oE frefodom, an i rw u then t i c 
I 
Itlode of existence, carrieG witf1 it tlw certainty of 
guilt~ \<f hi c h i s a re c o g n i t i on t ha t one i s no t 1 :L vi n g up 
to one's pot,;c>nLial, through a ,len:Ld of freC:Jo:n. An:x:Lety 
mu.st 
f re edoiJ. In Tillich's words, it is necessary to have 
11 courage to !Je 11 • 
Th2 f ilure to act or to waintain a course of 
action or style of xi;:::;t nee b cause it iu perceived as 
unsafe, ia xplain d as an inablity tor cognise that 
has been indicated, may be the possib:Uity of actual 
bodily death, or t lire at s to t be e 6 o.,,,., sys t e 1n , l ' ' unic.n most 
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of us ide11i.::ify ,·1:Lth ou:cselve:::-i. Non bcdng also cn<langcr8 
o 11 r e xi s ten c e t /1. r o u g h rn ea n in 8 1 e ::Hrn e s s • A [H.::' n, on rn a y f e e 1 
by the possibility that 'J • 111.S 1:ife has no 
The U;,,uol respons2 to such questionin:~; is to 
attempt to stop it Ly raea~s of immersion in life's daily 
r o u 1Hl o f a c ti v :L t :i e s a 1ul t t i tu d es " which, 1:,;:~cD use they 
are nearly universally endorsed, provide a buffer of 
readily co1H1tructed meaning. The price to be pni<l for 
thiu is fre do,1. One cannot ct other than \rithin the~ 
narrow range d0lineate<l by upbringing, class, race, sex, 
for to do :':o would question the V[c1li<lity of acquired 
and 1J o s s i bi 1 y e po s the i r s o 1 el y r e 1 at i v e 
v lue. 
en it 
18 Uf3t:crtcd that one should do as one pleases0* Sartre's 
Hotions of freeciou often cH.:'Clll ovt:rly individualistic, 
fa i 1 i n g t o ta k e iJ:1 to u c co u n t that 1 we are 
g 0 0.r:tou::3, a;id wo 1d probably not be as He ar , except 
coop :caLi.on \:1itb.in ~1nd aE1onc us to 
d v lop culture, knowledge, und so forth, Suffice to say 
£ r o ,u an c i st en t i a 1 p o :L n t o f v :1. e 11 we sh o u 1 d d o a a 
we please, bca int in i ct that, author of 
a n a c t i o 11 , o n e i ::> th_ 0 11 °t; o u n d t () a c c e p responsibility 
fur its conseq~ence • 
>:~ C ci. cu u r: h as e x a ra i n e d t h i s p r o b 1 e m i n 11 'f h e ll e b e 1 " • 
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To deny tno pos ibility of non-bein2 1 or to avoid 
situotions becnus0 they contnin such a posc;ibility, is 
rn:Lf;taken behaviour, since this reduces freedom, and 
impedes the developi:ient of self. This attitude is summed 
u p i n Ht et z sch e ' s fa.mo us di c t n rn th :J t n n y thin g -\·!hi ch does 
not kill me makes me stronsor. Stren3th here is not 
taken to imply some sort of a3gressive, 
assertive appronch, but an nttitude to life 
or even 
ich is not 
apt to deny aspects which a person finds uncomfortable 
or troubling. If an individual's routine is largely a 
matter of avoiding unpleasant situations, then that 
person really is beins shaped by the environment. 
tleurotic forrnf: of behnvionr arc the ususl nearw by which 
we deny the essential freedcrn to he. In the everyday 
course of events one may reasonably expect to encounter 
hostility and nf;gression. Yet Hlunys to net so as not to 
run the risk of provokin:_:, these re8ctions lends to a 
constriction of being, the feeling tbst one is not 
really a free agent, but rather an individual vho must 
always allay the onset of nnxiety, by confor~ing to the 
wishes or ideals of others. 
It can be seen t t the notions of anxiety, freedom 
and guilt are closely related concepts that inhere in 
beine. Being ontolo3ical categories, they cannot undergo 
an exhaustive objective description: they must be 
experienced. From the viewpoint of existential therapy, 
it Must therefore be assumed that progress or success 
lUl 
doec, not ;1c.csc,ly cutuil an intellsc:Cl:Vctl iiud~ht b ll t u. 
co n sci o us de c L;i on f o 11 cnr e d !J y an. act i o rt to 1 :L v e in so ,11 c, 
otltcr 1:1ny. 
An authentic exiutencc cnn lie clwract,~ ised ac: 
creative, in t ha t on c i s a L112 y c 1 o o k :L n z f or new u n g :L e tJ 
on o1d 
1:Lght;;J; l:/ll t 11 '··· ··1 •.·.•· o c /_.iI ••.·, t· J. r, n H • oestler c2clls u_.;;; ,i ""'"' ·"' • 
[/' 
"The 
perceivin0 o2 a ituati.on or idc:a in t,.Jo i.::::elf-•consistent 
·ut habitually inco1n1;atihle frci;.,1cs of refer e. 11 (VI) 
C 1· C U t i V i t J the ct cd: tL ,dmul t n ouEJ 1.ierc ption of 
o c o 1J j ec t i(lc or ituation in tcrv.if; ol: tuo tt tr:i.c<:!S. 
tri is nnJ aLility, ha.Lit, any p tterlJ o.C ordered 
b 11 a v i o u r L o v· t: r n d 1} y a c o ,.1 EJ o f f i. ;: d 1· u 1 (1'.:i) Thus, 
tl1c11 it is cr:ncHLially a 
It uust Le· uouJht out, and i,:i 
inh~rcntly ris y. ff and Cole (19U3) that, in 
a [:J t Udy Of l) i D. [i L 1 S J. t G~' noticed that 111 ,,Lnlly ill 
Q r_1 no u i 11 t r JJ s of 1' u L, b 11 it i es Ill 
t b c y i Ill 1> o :J e c c r ta i n t y on rd. Lu n t i u H w l ii c h ha v c 
on1y probalJili tic outcomes. Tliiu is noi.: l1ecuuse they 
pr u but} ~l l i Ei tic t I" c;i , b t l.> ca 11 so t J.1 e y ,,,, i .11 11 o t <} fl !r! :Lt t 11 e 
accord with the exL3tential idea of mental illness and 
b":haviour D./3 ntte1•.1pts to allay anxiety. It L, not 
to ;cnou, realistically, how our actions will 
10 2. 
t.uro out. 
t i n ::; u u i t h u n i t y • th peculinr 
to cl n:i. ,,1 cnrn i pot enc(! from th 
iBi: nt:1uJ.I ts set 
:e orth t hrec i-10,1 o.f hz?tng, nd with! this t ipartite 
factici.ty, 11umun:, o pj these 
three; 1-10cles :Luul t.nneo,wly. 
'Che world of i1atur , o .f b :Lo 1 o ,'., :L c a 1 n n cl [i h y s 1 ca 1 
nccesc:;i ty » i.:i 1:.noun ::u; t1U1rn1elt 11 (tlu? ,forld ;,1ro1121d). The 
\1()(10 of .. ' HJ. C!l one's f: 1 J.. O\TS entails 




r "'' 1 · '· ·i r <.·• ) __ ,, . a L .. o .. 1'"' • Tc:C i VeU. a 
go o d c1 en 1 o f t t 1J n t ion f r on ll a t t! r a J. 1; c :1 fc n c e fr<:ud, for 
in:, t.nnc n d l!i th in which 
the -t •. - .1 J .. ~L Ve -~t f/J Sinco 
ri htly or wrongly, to V t k e n t 11 i :-1 as the 
do,ni nar1t or onl1 110s :1.ble 110,J h r• 01: as 
biologic 1 Tl te cu:it::c 1ou 11,i f:! uf the 
ind·lvi<lual f orr:1e d lyin :i. n the 
suhco111:ci.ou • 
ii n i t v/ 0 1 t l! i s n O t me a n t t O i Il\ p 1 y ' as Kemp (1971) 
points out, social determinism, or the determination of 
consciousness by class in the Marxist sense, for 
example. This form of social influence may be included, 
1(1] 
b Ll t !,1 i t w ,: 1 t :L J~ Lt t:lonsldp 
1dth othcrn ulwrcby the 11 J 11 Gild the 11 r)thcr" [Jr~, 1,1utually 
:L11 t:errc1a t:u,1, ucl1 thGt n. cJ-1-::111ge i.11 011c nff(;ctc: n cJ1ant;c: 
in th(: otlt(Jr, t O i! ()i.l C' C X nt"' II r,1 11-i Hg of 
o tl1 r ;::; in th ;;roup io partly dete:crnined iJj u,H~' s 
r lDLionship to ch of t: h w. Tl ( 17) 
i ~licationa for tti.o exist ntirtl in that 
u 11 d cannot 
f.ford tot at his client s imp r onal ~ut of test 
r u1 t ;::; , 0 :c th 1 i f). s11cces::: o_( t.lit:rapy in 
unJcrut-'.)otl ta JJ _11d u ~ (:gt d ~11 on tl1::: quetlity of t 11 
1 c~ 1 at i cJ :n ::::, l1 i p ·- th cuunsellor 
C ot th h 
' . E:.:OiHC t of ,·1. D ~L ~3 of -'~ ·, ;..,,1.i. scie J t ~ 
,:, u L i n L i o n o f b. ;.node of lJ ing 
11 i g n 11 e 1 t: 11 ~ .. ,,()I' ]. d ) 0 d 1i .11()tl 
tia1 Ll Ot 11 yc1iolo 0 ic 1 
to ,io1 ly 
c:1a net rirJt:Lc1n It i inf t11 c.Iiaruc·L. 
po nt:l:ll t: 
,.. 




c ~.1 c t e r i B e d ti y d c 1 f a -\1 a :r c n e 8 ;; , s J. f - r u 1 t e cl n :; 2'3 , s e 1 f --, 
tr nscendencc. It: is th ability to grasp th weaning of 
uo 1 an (J to kno tlL1 t on many 
0 o .c uh :i c 11 a. r e c o up 1 ,, t 1 y )!ElT:JOHaJ. and 
idior,yncratic. 
In :re 0ard to freedor•t, it :1.s tlt,i Uil(lernourislment of 
tl1c eiL,,'rt'\u(Cclt whicl1 result::-:1 in lack of experiential 
fr dcH\. The other t.:vo utcJCl2;3 nrt:! cu,1,:i,J r d i 1,1 port n 11. t 
,, 
JJ y 
,:; Lent i ,.:. 1 i 1: t ,J , t t 1 e i 1.1 div J du a 1 s in 
:L n r l u {; Yl C ( \ hJi ( I, I tJ i fl ) () ! J Ct OJ."' other 
t of 11 thrc Jdod ,,. Jiov, v r, statecl 
. uy e.Llp 
t ',/ ;) lat:Lo is ll ,::Ji: u .V (?;CL () L () u v1orltl 
• ·1·_--?, ·v-~1_c)1··_,,_.,~, n (~,n,,) ;; , \ a 1 n u n _ -- , .c ,_. _ 1 __ at i t.o ay, the• 
r r (? c: t O _f lJ i O 1 :: y ~1 ·; 'i. d j l tt j q (1 n 1 n t C ;,r C t: i O n :c t~ 0 :t V n 8 0 V Q r 
hav little choic,~ t re arc 
., 
'._\ j_ i. t ··,/ 1 i>u.t 011 CHI!. safely 
. 1 ' C l) ;:..; C J. 0 U :J / t.,i \,; ,~loped, 
1t 1iouJL, in-cii tee::, it U.tJ. r 6 o!le a 
:~v 1 0 D • i our nd ncy t (_) divid':: 
t.:; tl h j C! t f or1t object, :J cl t o (.: ct u L ol;jc!ctivit? ( i. e, 
11ir1g divor fror:t un d 1L), L ut11fu1ness. 
:l l! t l,. ist nti li t tra JLion i th belie.i: 
t ;l ;Jt: th d v 1op::1c:11 of t.11 ,.:1 t i 8 j)riuary 
Jee i.: Co I t j I t \/ H t j_ e t h c e n t u r y , 
at 1.c:ui~·.:t., th u "' i :nc J tcclinoloi_,Y, the 
i r;t ilC rved Lo \'/ u!cen tl1e 
to t iico le lo g c:c l uo!-c to 
1v:::; .Co ],1 t s L. l 1 •J v 2 t: 11 n i i :3 tenc ::i 
bJ t 
the 1 ~~ 0 {) (J lif and othe sucb 





To examine the goals of existential psychotherapy 
it is useful to ask what is the task of psychotherapies 
and counselling methods in general. It could be 
generalized that mostly they are concerned with helping 
the person adjust to the demands of his environment. 
Scientific technology is interested primarily in 
attaining optimal performance. If one asks what is an 
optimal dairy cow, the answer is fairly obvious. One 
whicl1 produces more and better milk. What an optimal 
human being is, however, is nowhere near as clear. As 
fAr as is discernible, the cow doesn 1 t question whether 
or not it likes producing milk, or whether in fact it 
likes being a cow. It is not likely to ask itself 
questions concerning the "meaning of it all 11 , and 
whether or not life in the paddock is at all 
worthwhile? Humans, however do ask themselves these 
questions, and usually require reasonable, if not 
provable answers. Humans generally have to have reasons 
for doing things. Often these reasons are vague, 
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contradictory, or plainly false. However, they do 
provide a greater context in which people go to work, 
raise families, produce works of art, and so forth. This 
is the context of meaning. 
Questions of meaning are not part of the natural ? 
science methodology. Therefore, at a certain level, the 
natural sciences lose their ability to satisfactorily 
elucidate human behaviour. The existential tradition 
holds questions of meaning to be of importance. To set 
goals for existential psychotherapy, it seems necessary 
to make clear what the existential view of iihurnan" is, 
and what is good for a human. Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
both posed questions concerning the human condition. 
Basically they concluded that man is a creature who is 
only partially complete. It is the task of an individual 
in his time to develop and mature his own innate 
potentialities. This will not happen automatically, but 
requires conscious, directed effort. Part of this effort 
lies in questioning the nature and circumstances of 
one 1 s own conditions. To live one's life in unquestion-
ing obedience to the strictures of social and cultural 
institutions is to live inauthentically; to live not as 
a human, but as a thing. Whether conditions at any time 
have been suited to living an authentic life is 
questionable. However, the mass society \'le now inhabit 
seems particularly detrimental to this project. Such a 
society is geared to generalised consumption, not merely 
of goods, but also of ideas, tastes, and attitudes. 
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The industrial, high-tech society necessitates an 
homeogeneous system of values, since it relies on mass 
action of a highly co-ordinated and co-operative nature 
to achieve its ends. TJ1e ideas of progress, wealth for 
all, the all-redeeming power of money, have welded 
industrial society together for over a century. People 
in such a society are more and more apt to be defined, 
and to define themselves, in terms of their eight-to-
five activity. Herbert Marcuse (1972) has written about 
the flattening out of human nature, what he calls one-
dimensional man. Marcuse argues that the successful 
western societies, whether they be of a democratic or 
totalitarian nature, become less and less tolerant of 
individual diversity the more they are aLle to protect 
the individual from want. The satisfaction of needs 
real or created - demands, he says, a quid pro quo. This 
is obedience of thought and action. Tl1e debasement of 
language through stereotypic forms of mass-communication 
renders it bland, ridden with cliches, predictable, and 
universal. This is essentially an Orwellian argument, 
which states that language and other forms of symbolic 
communication and ideation supply the means by which we 
formulate 
impossible 
alternatives and opinions. It 
to design viable alternatives 
becomes 
or to 
articulate them, because the symbolic means to formulate 
critiques are absent, due to the i1uµoverishment of 
language. 
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The average person does not see himself as 
inhabiting some sort of Orwellian wasteland however. 
Yet, it is apparent that a good many people find 
themselves in positions of work, marriane and so forth 
which they would prefer to vacate. What keeps most of 
them in line? 
The above is mentioned to illustrate that freedom 
is a rather intangible and nebulous notion when one 
considers it in a human and social context. Yet freedom 
is the avenue that the existential psychotherapist is 
trying to open up for his client. This freedom springs 
from a realistic awareness of the person's position in 
the world, and a certain capacity to endure the 
inevitable anxiety which accompanies living by one's own 
choices. Basescu (1974) defines free will as the felt 
experience of freedom of choice. This freedom may be 
related to physical freedom, but is not contained by it. 
Socrates and Thomas Moore are historical example of 
individuals whose freedom of choice resulted in 
physical confinement and death. Freedom, Basescu 
maintains, is greatest where the most potential exists -
rather as if we stood at the junction of many roads. Yet 
to experience freedom, one must choose, and 
paradoxically accept, a reduction of freedom. That is, a 
lessening of choice due to a commitment to a choice of 
action. 
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To armour ourselves against the fact that we are 
always standing at a point where decisions are 
warranted, we have religious and philosophical systems 
which not only provide meaning but often prescribe 
courses of action. God, as Nietzsche insists, may have 
died, but being sorely missed, he has been revived, 
rather vindicating Voltaire's assertion that if god 
didn't exist then we would have had to invent him. A 
religious attitude is an attitude of wonder, and the 
que8tioning of our meaning in the cosmos. As such, it is 
part of man's general tendency to seek, to need to find 
meaning. It is only when man stops qu stioning and, 
satisfied with provisional answers, he wraps himself in 
closed systehls and dogmas, that his religions and 
philosophies become stagnant, oppressive, and inhuman. 
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Given that the existentialists emphasise the 
primacy of consciousness and self-awareness in humans, 
and view with disdain the attempt to view the human 
level of human behaviour re<luctively (to reduce 
consciousness to Stimulus-Response, for example), what 
then is their approach to dealing with the problems of 
their clients in a therapeutic setting? 
There is no school of existential psychotherapy as 
such, that could be identified by a common background 
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of training and/or method. Rather, what identifies the 
existentiallly-oriente<l therapi8t is the set of 
assumptions that arise from tl1e ontological inquiry into 
human nature, originating in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
Binswanger, Sartre and others. Fro@ these follow certain 
generalised methods and orientations. 
identifies a number of these: 
Kemp (1971) 
(1) Techniques follow understanding. This is taken to 
mean that the primary task of the existential counsellor 
is to establish the nature of his client's mode of 
being. From this follows the application of any 
particular technique. 
(2) Existential counsellors ask different questions 
from counsellors of differing orientations. This follows 
from the first consideration, in that, to establish the 
nature of tha client's being-in-the-world the therapist 
asks questions which help him to clarify what it is the 
client is attempting to achieve. This is based on the 
ex i s t en t i a 1 c once p t o f h ur:ia n p o t en ti a , w hi c h a r e always 
seeking to be achieved, but which may become thwarted or 
dtstorted. 
(3) Problems take their meaning from the client's own 
immediate ontological existence. The past is assumed to 
be an important influence, only as the client perceives 
it. The drives, reinforcement and learning histories 
mentioned by other models are not denied validity, but 
are examined from an ontological perspective, that is, 
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as potentia for existence which may be denied due to the 
desire to avoid anxiety. 
(4) Existential counselling requires a unique 
relationship: it is the being of the counsellor which is 
seen to be tl1e II :La re 1 at ions 11 i p n1 us t be 
a genuine one, based on a sincere desire to understand 
the other person. An approach based on an over-confident 
belief in the efficacy of technique or technological 
knowledge merely objectifies the client, and puts him 
out of the reach of the therapeutic process. 
(5) Exi.stential counselling requires a unique 
purpose. The purpose of existential counselling is the 
recovery and maintenance of authentic being. It has 
nothing to <lo with social adjustment. 
(6) Commitment is primary. 1'1 . ll S follows from the 
realisation that insight into one's own condition does 
not necessarily solve one's problem. Intellectualisation 
does not necessarily lead to action. Thus, the client 
makes pronress only to the extent that he is affectively 
committte<l to make decisions, and to act upon them. 
( 7) Attitude towards anxiety. While it is not 
necessary to engender anxiety, it is recognised that 
anxiety is the sign tlaat something is happening with the 
client. There is some area in which he is unable to 
commit himself. Anxiety is not to he avoided. 
It can be seen from these few points that the 
existential approach to counselling is not scientific, 
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in the sense that there is a well-formulated methodology 
and technique, but philosophical. It Legins from an 
investigation into the nature of being human - what 
being human entails by way of potential 1 anxiety and so 
on. Self=av,areness is seen to change 
,. 
OI 
potential, and the nature of apprehending the world. 
Thus, things are not only what they are, but also what 
they me8n. 
Technique is a matter of taste for the existential 
counsellors, although they eschew those which they see 
as de-humanising. Disregarding the valiuity of the 
existential world-view, the soundness of collll elling is 
thus dependent on the ability 0£ the the:capist to be 
what he is helping his client to be, that is, an 
individual who can authentically manifest his true self, 
and who is also capable of a large degree of empathy and 
understanding of others. 
Carkhoff and Berenson (1967), in a critical review 
of the major psychotherapies, criticise the existential 
method for being overly intellectual. "Host often the 
communication process involves analysing the existential 
meaning of human experience, rather than the direct 
expression of experience •••• thus the process is, as in 
client-centred therapy, a highly verbal transaction 
analyzing words about feelings." (1) They further go on 
to say: "The ultimate goal of any successful therapeutic 
process must be action on the part of both therapist and 
llJ 
patieJtt. '1 (2) Thifl criticism is obviously at variance 
wit li Ke r11 p ( 19 7 l ) , who agrees thai: action and commitment 
to action are therapeutic fuudamentals. The fact that 
there is no definable 
psychotherapy, does not alloli 
school of 
J: -- ---.!. lJ l a general 
1nethod, technique and ::;o forth. However, 
existential 
Uvei. vlcw of 
Bugental, a 
widely known American existential counsellor, is 
explicit that actions are wore inportant than 
verbalizations~ "The concepts of existential psychology 
are meant to portray and illuuinate the bas:Lc human 
exp<":riences. An existentialism th t is abstract and 
chiefly intellectual verbal is a self-contradiction." 
(3) lle recogniseti, nevertheless, that the therapist's 
room i:::; far removed from the outs:L<le world, where 
decisions mad in theraµy must be acted upon. Thus, in a 
group process, to confront the meaning of 11 rny death", 
the exercises Bugental initiates are unintellectual, and 
contain as much .ffective content s his kill allows 
him to inject into the situation. Obviously, the ability 
to create a II re a 1 11 at rn o s plier e is de pen <le ll t on the 
c o r,1 p e t e n c e o f t h e t h E; r a p i s t • 
Carkhoff ' anu J3erenson find that many e istential 
therapists are overly verbal. This is, however, a 
c r i t i c i :::. Ft o f i n (li v i du al pr a c t i t i o n r , not a telling 
critique of the theory as such. On the contrary, the 
reported behaviour of such therapists as cited by 
C,1.rkhoff et al is at: variance vrith the stated aims and 
spirit of exiutentialisi11, which is lloth:iHG if not a 
practical approacli. 
Vi th regard to existential coulli::e.lli11g aud therapy, 
C 1:ir k ho f f et a 1 make other per ti neut re 1,1 c:i r ks : 
(i) :Existential counselling alloivs th1:,; po~;si'Lility of 
an honest humau encounter. "Indeed, of all the major 
therapeutic orientations, the e istential approach 
offers the greatest possibility for both therapist and 
client to e1I1ploy themselves fully._ 11 (Li) 
Carkhoff et al see tile existential 
approach as positive, in that it r· r 01:rers a "well-
d e v e 1 o 1J e <l c o s rn o 1 o g y 11 w i t li i n \v h i c h t h e c 1 i e n t rn a y f i n d 
direction. This may be true, aud although Carkhoff et al 
mean i t a e:l a p o s i ti v e s t a t e ni en t , fr om an e i s tent i a 1 
viewpoint the provision of: r ady--i,1ade cosmologies is 
soLiething to be avoicle<.L On th,~ ue 6 c1tive side, the 
world--view of the existentialists is seen as a 
hindrance, in that it is limitetl by what it excludes. 
This is especially true in the therapeutic sphere, where 
certain techniques r;my be ruled out because they are 
seen to treat man as less than human. 
(3) Tl1e value-system of the existentialists is made 
explicit, and therapy, therefore, has recognisable 
goals. This is :i.n contradiction to most therapies. 
(4) Finally, the existential approach necessitates a 
"healthy" therapist, since the therapist does not merely 
employ techniques as tools, but more importantly, 
115 
crente3 au ambience. Thus "as in 11 psychotherapy the 
procef:t:3 :Lt: aLi effective ar, the therapist :i.s whole. 
However, in existential therapy, tbe theraJJist is the 
1 i vi H ;J e nt bod i men t o f t h e v a 1 u_ e ,:1 w lLi c h t he s y st cc rn make s 
explicit. I t !1i us t v e u n d er s c or e d that i :n s u ff i c i en t 
attention is giveu to the logical ext nsion of 
exit ntial thinking: the th rapist must teach by the 
e urn:µle of liis person, not by hi analysis. In acting 
the therapist expreirnes his existence - and it had 
better be a ;;;ood one 11 (S) 
Carklioff and Berenson pr seuL thcdr views on 
ex:'L tentia1 therapy iu tlie cont of a book e amining 
wost They Elake the 
ob ervatioH that any therapy ii, only as good as tbe 
t b e r a pi s t i s 11 v! ho 1 e r1 • T tw t her a pi s t nee d s t o p o s :oms s 
sufficient (i.e., vast) reservoirs of physical and 
emotional energy, and h ve an ability to be completely 
hon ,: t. Th th r pist who f! personal level of 
de v e l o p ta en t :i s tl u c h t hat it e 1,rn s t d e f en d 1 • -1 _r_ n1.m:se.LL, guard 
his own insecure self, is of 1itt1 us to the person 
::::flekini liirJ help. 
Carkhoff t al account for a great deal of 
tlierapeutic p ogres not in terms of technique or 
pii:Uo~;ophy (altlrnugli they allow a plnce for these), but 
by the level of functioning of thE; th rapist himself. 
11 Co u n s e 11 i n g and p r, y ch o therapy c in.1 li ave c o ri s t r u c t i v e o r 
deteriorntive consequences for clients, and these 
11G 
chang s cun be accounted for by the level of the 
therapist functioning on facilitative dirnensioHs, in<lep-
endently of the therc1pif1t's orientat:Lons. 11 (Ci) 
The level of functioning cientioneu above refers to 
the quality of communication exhibited Dy the thc:;rap:tst, 
formulated in terms of honesty, e1c1patliy, pod. ti ve 
re ard, nd the like. The client is able to explore 
witiliu the r lationship only to the extent that the 
therapist co sisteHtly exhibits these qualities. 
Theoretically, the existential orientation to 
therapy should be extremely effective, tlince it extols 
the virtues of esta.bl:ir-ihin3 souud and. honest 
relationship with the client. Tlie therapist tries to 
ube11 with the client, as they say. Effective 
co r,1m uni c t :Lon ls not po r:; i b 1 r::i , iu the vie\f of the 
existenti li ts, unless tlit; th rapi~,t can Dee things 
from t)1e client's viewpoint. Thus the maim that 
uad rst ndin~ vr c des techniqu • 
I t :i s .P r haps to nt a k e an obvious point that the 
originators of quite divers types of therapy were 
'l'···:1~~ J. flt J. V l C L(<c_,:., __ ;;-, ofteH quite noU:, bl for their unique, 
forci:ifuJ. or ch risuati personalities. Thus it may be, 
as Car hoff et al contend, that the success of psycho-
aualysic:J, (; e s ta 1 t , o r Be ha v :Lo u r l lo d :i f i c a t i on h as not so 
wucb to do with techniques or the correctness of theory 
per se liut with the effectivent-:ss of tile practitioner as 
<l cown,unicator and motivator, a fl an u n d e r st a n cl i n g a n d 
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clarifying influ nee. Possibly thi:::; is nlcrn t!i.e reason 
why the proliferation of tberapi ::; often liHvc an almost 
cult nature. f,lany depend for tl10d.r Btrent;th on the 
attrG.ctive power of a single guru. figure, 
qualitiev which Car}:~hoff et - "I u .L hold 
11ccesuary for ff ctive tli r py regardless of 
theoretical ori tation 1 a e also those which are 
by ;d::,tent:isl philo,rnphers nd thE·rapists. 
Needless to ay, it is one thing to sp k of ellipathy and 
quality of commu11ication 1 and 11other Lo di 1d.ay the 
same consistently, ur to b aLle to critically examine 
oue 1 s own co1c1 uuicative atti ude. Ho oubt we all 
consider ours lves good~ ll OU judiced cornuuuicators. 
Communication failure i almost lway plained by the 
ineptitude or stupidity of the other ll r ou aad not by 
poor sign lling on one vs ov1n 1i rt, 
The dv ntag of an e i:::t ntial therapy iu that it 
placcis the f .nd ls of tli r py at L c ntr rather 
than ut the periphery, wher tbey rnay per a useful 
but not particularly import nt c:idjuncts to more 
scientific teclrniqu s. This assertion is of course 
dependent for its validity on the idea that the:i;-apy is a 
ma t t er of a t,1 et in g of ind iv id u a 1 h u us • If ,this is 
not true then so,!te ther pies could equ lly well he 
carried out by machine technology. 
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ETHICAL ISSU.U:S IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
From the point of view of usable techniques in 
therapy, the existentialists are in somewhat of a bind. 
They are loathe to employ certain methods, such as some 
conditioning techniques, since they see this as reducing 
man's status to that of an object, or at least to some 
passive organism whose actions may be shaped this way or 
that. They are not so closed to the matter as to assert 
that bel1avioural conditioning is ineffective. Indeed, if 
it was ineffective, it would presumably be non-
controversial. Rather they see that there is danger in 
that, at times such methods may be effective. From this 
limited degree of effectiveness, advocates of such 
methods are prone to conclude that (a) the methods could 
be effective at any time if only conditions could be 
controlled and relevant reinforcement histories known 
etc; (b) since the method is effective (if only 
partially) then its underlying rationale, its 
theoretical base, and the view of man it promotes, is 
also sound. This clearly is not a logical conclusion. 
Skinner denies that he holds to any particular theory. 
However one may deduce a person's philosophy to some 
extent, not only by what he holds to be relevant, but 
also by what he deems to be of no consequence. 
In order to run counter to the prevailing world-
view in psychology, which sees man as a rather complex 
119 
machine capable of being conditioned in any way given 
the right techniques, the existentialists are somewhat 
driven to deny that some levels of behaviour are 
amenable to conditioning and counter-conditioning. The 
:01rg11rnPnt· is not only one of means but also of ends~ 
Existentialism has a world-view, and therefore must 
consider what effects the whole. Existentialists do not 
see behavioural techniques in isolation, but as merely 
one more aspect of the dehumanisation of mankind. There-
fore, although they may at times be useful, their use is 
to be avoided. 
It is easily arguable that many problems requiring 
therapy are not neccessarily of an existential nature. 
Such problems as could be labelled existential indicate 
a somewhat self-questioning, quasi-philosophical 
attitude, on tlte client's part. It is doubtful that all 
problems spring from an inquiry or doubting of the 
1neaning of life in general, or mine in particular. Thus, 
as ·wi'th any therapy ·which is based essentially on a 
theory of how things are, the use of such theory-based 
therapy ruay not be indicated when the problem falls 
outside its realm. Psychoanalysis has made itself the 
object of satire and parody at times by attempting, 
apparently, to base all human problems on freudian 
categories of biological determinism. The temptation to 
characterise all psychological difficulties as being of 
an existential nature, invites the same reaction. 
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Anotl1er problem facing the existential therapist is 
that he is not, or rathert cannot be, if he is what his 
name implies, an advocate of therapy for adjustment or 
socialisation. Consequently, how he fits into the mental 
health schema may be problematical, given its links to 
the powers upholding the status quo. An existential 
therapist is concerned, not with supplying a personal 
frame of reference which is compatible with social or 
political norms, not with making a person a useful 
member of society, as the expression has it. On the 
contrary, the living out of an individual's potential 
may involve hi@ in the thorough questioning of the 
customs of thought and behaviour which have been 
inculcated and accepte<l since childhood. 
Expressions such as 11 increasing a person's 
efficiency 11 , "making a person useful", or "helping to 
a<ljust 11 are not favoured by the existentialists, since 
they connote attitudes which one holds in relation to 
objects or tools. For the existentialists, the L HU !lid il 
being is an end in himself. He or she needs no 
justification for existence in terms of productivity or 
usefulness to society. Heidegger observed that in the 
twentieth century there is a tendency for even humans to 
be judged and quantified in terms of their usefulness 
to the productive forces of industrial society. Humans 
are thus counted as a "standing reserve 11 , a sort of 




are reflected in expressions in the language 
so commonplace that their origin and 
implication are given little thought. We have the 
Labour Department. In Canada it is known as the Manpower 
Department. A permanent percentage of the population is 
unemployed, and this is seen as sound economic policy, 
as if the idea was that the economy's soundness is 
somehow divorced from the common good. The economy has 
managed to become reified as some sort of deity which 
humans keep in good health by scrambline to find a place 
in its machinations, and by occasionally sacrificing 
themseles to unemployment. E. F. Schumacher points out 
that we have turne<l the essential meaning of 
civilisation on its head. nour civilisation, rather than 
seeking the perfection or refinewent of human character, 
i:::i almost wholly concerned with tlte H,u1tiplicz,tion of 
wants." (7) Social adjustment implies a pattern of 
behaviour and thought which does not irnp1icitly or 
explicitly question the prevailing codes, whether these 
Le of law or custon1. Since the existential therapi8t 
must supposedly question the meaning uf such codes for 
hiwself, his answers are not necessarily those generally 
accef)ted. 
A further proLlem vis-a-vis therapeutic aid stems 
from the view that things and the world have no final 
meaning or at least any one meaning which is better than 
numerous others. The pain, suffering or happiness etc, 
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experianced in life, cannot be given meaning o.r 
justification with reference to some greater cosmology, 
and therefore be ma.de easier to withstand. Thus the 
existential therapist cannot be party to what Tennessen 
( 1 9 6 6 ) ca 11 1:i 11.s u i f i cation" , w hi ch i s the o f f er i n g of 
comforting illusions and philosophies in place of 
intellectual honesty and the :maintenance of a 
questioning attitude. Tennessen maintains that full 
humanisation or self-realisation necessitates the 
ad@ission thnt life in general and one's own life in 
particular is quite without meaning. lie does not equate 
humanity or maturity with what is usually called 
psychological health, which is rather, he says, the 
ability to adapt, somewhat alons the lines of 
biological/environmental adaptation. In this case, one 
adapts onc,J 1 s attitudes and ideas to better ensure one's 
survival. This is psychological health, hut not the 
rlcvelop1;ient of one's hurnani ty, h says. Tennea::1en makes 
some :,i cat hi ng, a 1 thoug ii lluJiwrous re mar ks, ah out some 
psychotherapies, and about some exi stem tial 
psychotherapies, especially Frankl's, which seek to 
provi(lc a philosophical s fety net for their clients, 
and 11 •••• to save them from tl!e vertiginously pernicious, 
insufferable insi;;hts into the monstrous absurdity of 
human life. 11 (B) The sensat:ion or realisation of 
absurdity is a theme which recurs throughout existential 
1 it e rat 11r c0 • I t i ['l hound to the l 111 rn an sear ch f o :r m. ea n i n g 
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and the doubtfulness of. tlt•s) existence of any final 
meaning, We do not intend to enter into a discussion of 
whet.her or not life has r,u..canin[,;. Suffice to say, that 
p e o p 1 c~ t 11 i n k i t i s i iH p o r t n n t t t :L t i, l 1 c, u 1 d ha v e , o r ma y 
have, or H1ay not he,ve '11 
The existentiti.1 th rzq)ist does not count ainong his 
tasks either the adaptation of the individual to society, 
or the provision of 11 rn ea n in g for 1 if e" , which may give 
a person the motivation to continue living. Clarity is 
what the existenti 1 tlier pist seeks for hirnse:L[ and his 
client His role is to develop in his client an 
awareness of his (the client's) actual condition as a 
human. Thifl i not meant to imply that clear awareness 
of one's own condition is equal to some sort of final 
knowled g,),. quite the con t:cary. As Tennessen points out, 
our n10::It penetn1ting insight at this tiwc can oHly be 
that our knowledge is extremely imperfect. 11 It ueern::; 
that: the only incorrigible knowli,dge we have ascerta:1.necl 
so far is that there 1s no incorrigible knowledge" /~, \';I) 
In this light it can be seen that the term 
11 ex1stential psychotherapy 11 is used in a rather wider 
sense than it should be. liany so called e istential 
therapies are concerned with the supply of meaning and 
modes of adjustment. It i s not that t lH, ex is tent i a 1 is ts 
claim that life does not or can not have meaning. What 
tht' meaninc, c., however, is for each individual to 
discover by his own means. If he can discover no meantng 
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then he must conclude in all honesty that life is 
essentially absurd. 
To what extent psychotherapists of an existential 
inclination live up to these conditions is unknown. It 
does seem to follow that anyone calling himself an 
existential psychotherapist must be prepared, as 
Tennessen put it~ " ...... 
outdoors.'! (10) ·It is worthwhile· tcr iiote· tli'at' .. Teiiri'essen 
himself is speak.ins of philosop_h~r:;,, wlrn, :,vhile being · 
an arlmitable group of people, do not, in their 
professional existence, confront the anxiety and misery 
which befall many people, and which is the daily round 
for psychotherapists. It seems reasonable to assert that 
any therapist worthy of the name is capable of a degree 
of empathy with his clients. It is difficult to see how, 
given such empathy, a therapist would not be moved to 
try to improve the psychological lot of the individual 
in the direction of what is generally called happiness. 
Happiness may of course connote lack of insight. 
Ignorance is bliss. How therapists resolve the tension 
between a human desire to improve the life conditions 
of their clients and their existential viewpoint is 
unknown. 
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S U i'I H A R Y 
In the relationship of existentialism 
p y ch o l o 1,:; y , i t :1. EJ n e c e :cm a r y t o re- i t r:c r a t e t hat t her e i s 
great deal of controversy and debate within the 
Jiccipline as tow tits goals, if any, should be, what 
cons tit tes tht:) most fruitful line of research, what 
u o d e 1 1::1 o f 1;u111. , consciou1.n1ess, intelligeuce and so on, 
u e most viable. Also how closely should psychology 
identify itaelf wit~1 the principles and l'letltods of the 
natural sciences? Clearly there are multiple lines of 
demarcation ad contention, and no unifying principles, 
other tli.an the general description of psychology as the 
study of buman behaviour. Psychological debates could 
becoue endlessly l.io;;ee d down in the consideration of tiie 
rc1 n:inL of tl1e definition alJove, that is, wlwt L:3 human, 
c1nd what is behaviour'? 
Th re is disagreement ov,~r (a) How far t11e r:wtho<l8 
t k n from the natural sciences can be employed 
usefully. llar;:;aret BoJen (1972) claim:::.: that, at least in 
theory 
' 
a reduction of psyc logy to physiology i c• ~,
fea3ible. rn1 .t 11e difficulty is that an explanation of 
raotivation in such terms nwy lie 1:1eaninglesLJ, in that it 
has lost sight of what it set out to exvlain. 
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(b) The goa.ls of 
psychology. Is psychology a JHtre sc:i.en.ce? Civen the 
numerous uses psycholo;~ical .findinrin are put t:o, tldo 
opinion uonld be difficult to r:rnhstnntiate. Are itfl 
goals the predicion and control ndvocuted by Cor,1te nnd. 
Saint-Simon, t-i::J pHrt of an effort to hrinr; order and 
rationality to society by Pte3ns of the sciences ? 
Given its subject matter, it would he difficult to 
defend the notion that psychology is ethically neutral. 
Correctly or incorrectly, in the publi.c mind, the 
findings of psycholoey :=ire taken ns pronouncements about 
how we are ton lar~e extent. 
Tak in '.~ th es e fa c tor :.1 i n t o n c c o u n t , it SCCfilG 
j. n c o n f.·l i s t e n t t o d i s m i n s f' x i :3 t e n t i a l i s m b c c a u r: c o f i t s 
ilflplicit nnd Pzplicit ethical or value co11tcnt. It 
merely debates in the open nnd makes nr:ncrtions 
concern i n '.', ni at t ("rs w h :l. c h psycho lo:~ y , 8 n d i ,1 c i p 1 j, n c , 
l a r f; c 1 y kc e p r~ i n t e r no 1 i s c d • 
Further~ore, existentialism cnnnot be rulod out of 
court becnuse of itD non-adherence to principles that, 
it maintains, are only applicable to the n21 tural 
sciences. Psychology, if it is to be a science of 
humans, must forgo attempts to achieve the rigours of 
the hard sciences. The advantage it so ,:1chieves is that 
it retains intelligibility. 
The concepts of existentialism are not compatible 
with a program of investigation that requires strict 
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ell\ pi r i c a l v a 1:Ll D t i on • Therefore, it Hust be conceded 
that a_n existentia1 mode of investigation is on1y 
uh2n it is uniquely human clwracteristics 
thrJ_t are to be looked at Uhere th() dividin;_; line i:3 
in human behaviour betl1eE:n t uniquely 
li u rn 8. n a fl t h a t w h i c h :1 s c o rn m o n t o large number of 
aI1i.n1als, is not easy to deter ine. It is asserted that 
it is at the;; level of self-con ciousness, aesthet:ic or 
s nauous appreci tio~, er ativity, uhere questions of 
that an 
e istential analysis of the human situation becomes 
i no one body of literatur which 
can b said to repr sent existen H1tir::: , it is possible 
to d 0, r :i_ v e ,n a. n y ,:i ha J e :3 o f ,n caning on nu ifl er o us i ;::: s u es from 
wr:i.ters, pl ywri::.;hts, psychologists and th like, who 
call themselves or are called existentialists. Despite 
' t • -c,11 it i pperent th.at i tentialism ca ies with it 
n u w be r o f t he sn s a n d has an :i.wpl:Lcit 
content It in not aligned, for instance, to the notion 
of material progress. Science, nd technolo;::;y, as they 
are now practised 1 contain the assue.,11Jtion that the 
iwprovement and perfection of mat rial and technique 
\dll result i.n a contiuual ;,1ov rnent towards SOhH? ideal 
future. The existentialists make no such assumptions, 
altl1ough they are not hostile to technological progress 
a3 such. 
Existentialism, 
l 'J (l ,t,U 
on the other hand., llpholds a certain 
rn o d ci 1 o f 1.,.r hat i t c on s i d e :r s t o b {j t he t r u l y h urn an be in g 
nnd the truly authentic life. It rnnin tains thr:!se models 
i n t lu, b c 1 i e f t h c1 t h u in a n h e i n g s a r e i n; w r e n t 1 y f :c e e , and 
that thiG free~ state is sorueho-•A good and desirable~ 
These ,.1,J,3urnptions, of CGU.l"'S-f~, are alwuys open to 
quescion Also implied by th exi3tentialists is the 
view that bu ns are in some way unique, ::ind that this 
uniqueness makes them sacrosanct, such tllat they cannot 
he treated as objects, too1s, or other nwa!li, to an end. 
The ,,10dification of hun1:c.111 behaviour by Jfleuns which 
app nr to overlook or deny that lHu:HHUJ ,n· u s e 1 f -
conscious o capable of self deterwinution, is t.:leen as 
demeaning u1ani pu 1a t ion, which, 1Jllut2ver its 1legree of 
e ff r::; c t iv en e s s i n ma ld n r; t h c i n J i v id u a l us ful and 
f11nctionins 11-ienh r of society, is oLjcctiunablo. It is 
objectionable in that it denies and discourages humans 
to he what the existentialists t; y they actu;:illy are, 
th ;_1 t i s 7 f re e ~ Ag a i n , i t he c o n1 c 8 c 1 e [i. r th a t th e 1 eve 1 o f 
functio,ling rnost ,u,ienalJle to coiHl:Ltiouint:, t.echniques is 
a nrnttt:~r of contention. J~xistentialiut like ;~artre, who 
propose an absolute degree of r 1 :i: ree<toLi i would Bay that it 
is not proper at any level. One could take it from 
!1erl au-Ponty, on t: lie ot:li0ir hund, atJ uell as JI(iidegger, 
that there are aspects of human behaviour which are 
mostly unconscious, and that these may be changed only 
by conditioning or other technological methods. Any 
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existentiolist would wnrn however, that to think of a 
person sr: tH,i ne any Jess h un:nn t lwn oneself ( '.Ji th a11 
thf:' meaning of humnn so fnr mentioned) is nn xtrer,H}ly 
dnnnerous practice, not only for the client, but 
ultinntely for us a11.,* 
In the psychotherapeutic settir~:, the 
existentialists ern sise wh2t they see s th primary 
importance of eigcnweJ.t the experience from the 
position of the subjective 11 I". A healthy individual i11 
this schems e pc•riences the uorld trnd other,J chiefly 
throur,h this personrd mode The l ck or ~ininishment of 
tbe '1bility to rlo this rcsn1ts in the experience of 
remoteness, str2n3eness or revulsion in regard to 
th inf. s or p e op 1 e P o .s ,d b 1 y t h i D u b j c t i v c\ 0' p ri e n c e u :f 
oneself may be r1.ininshed to c'.:u :1 n te t that it 
nzer c1rL'.::,2s for the c1i nt in that \1 !J co1,1es, in 
the eyes of the the pj t, object which 
must be picked up and placeJ on th right cour c. The 
existenti<:tl . . t v1ewpo:tn. plac~s pnrti ulur v lu on the 
acceptanc of responsibility for on 'sown life. As far 
as they are concerned, be in ~; lurn an ,n can s ha i n g that 
ability to tran c t1 \'/hat :i given in any :::ituation The 
disencoura.gement to each person to interpret each 
situation for himself through a diminution of 
res pons i bi 1 i t y i s a d :i s enc our age men t t o d eve 1 o 1) hum ail 
characteristics. 
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becomes difficult for the person to feel he has any 
identity or substnnce wh0tsoever. 
J~xistential psychotherapy en1pl1anisc::1 t Lt e 
development of the capacity to perceive oneself nc:: the 
central originator of actions vis a vis one's own life. 
Life experiences are moved frow th real1,1 of tl1e 
(th i·c•c.• . ·-11,:,,.:, happen) to 
personal ( thinr:;s happen to me) 
The role of the therapist in existential therapy is 
viewed as being of utmost importance. Carkho.f.[ et al 
(1967) maintain that this is true in 11 2ffective 
therapy. However, in th1:.)r,)py it is 
explicitly stated. This ernplwsis on th quality of being 
of the thernpiot derives fro the e istcnti 1 notion 
that one individual cannot obj ctiv ly co11,p (~hend 
another in any complete seHse. The b t t.i1at can he 
done i s t o tr y t o r,1 n \: ci con t u c t \vi th t L :, u b j ,2 c t iv e 
world 
,. 
OI the other erEJon,. To do thi th tl1er p:Lst r,1ust 
attempt to perc ive what meaning hii:i client placcs on 
different aspects of his 1,rn r 1 d • Th 2 a ppr e 111:: 11 :; i o u f: ;;-:; u cl i 
meanini; is of paramount iinportanc Uitho t it, 
client and the therapist can only communicat 
people who only imperfectly or not ut ct rs tanzl 
each other's language. 
The emphasis on the eigcmrelt. as the ii;tportnnt 1,tode 
of experience for humans does not detract frorn the 
influence or either the umwelt or mitwelt modes. All 
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three are active, nnd intE:ract, nut for tlie human 
beinc the existenti8lists hold, It is byte self aware 
creative person thnt hi0lo3ical nd :::o ial infhH~ncet3 
are interpreted. The influence);} ex rt cl by ociul and 
biological 
their own character, ht rath 
person to such fnctor I!> of 
authentic r~.e1:1.ninr; tnl:cs pln (: Ja tI1e uiijectivc 
eigenwe1t mode. 
The effect ::i vent?::.1 ,, of c: i t ~: ti 1 1i:.: y Jlllt hero. py 
£ sucI1 
characteristics as empathy, affc!ct:iv2 coi;n,1.unic ion, and 
the ability to crer\t.:e an 8mbience of ho;H.! ty- nd trust., 
Existential therapj,~tc; attem t t b id, ,_1 L ;1 gap 
between inrlividuals not Ly cDtc o:ci,iin;,; various 
essential chs<lrRcteristics of inclivirluuls u (1 then 
manipulating 
communication leap '\rhich does not t:i1c1iiJy jnvol (> wor<l:3, 
but all the other huFtan nyt1\1101 an<l 
emotional n.uancEJ that ar co,1::,100 to lJL! n:: Ly irtue of 
shared experiences. 
The emphasis on the qu lity of co1:1rrn1iic t:i.on and 
on the being of th ti1 ;-,! i L ,r!;: 1 o tlt b l:L,~f that 
psychological difficulties arise not siwply due tu the 
action of external forces, but by the interpretation of 
such forces by the individual. 
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An over-emphasis on verbal communication and 
intellectualisation by some existential therapists has 
been noted. How general this characteristic is, is 
unknown. But it may be indicative of the fact that the 
background of existentialism is largely literary and 
philosophical, and that psychologists who have an 
ex:i.Sterit:i.al 'ot:fehtat:i.on are become overly 
engrossed 
existential 
in the philbsdPhi~~l implications of an 
questioni11g. H~nce, they talk too 
too little. In this regard, a wall of lofty 
concepts is as restrictive as any rigid theory or strict 
adherence to technique. Despite this, existentialism, it 
must be noted, stresses commitment to action. Being 
implies action. 
In existential psychotherapy understanding is 
placed before technique. Such understanding is gained by 
the method of using no method, of letting things be. In 
principle, at least, the therapist does not attempt to 
view the client through filters of theory or concept. It 
is tl:'feir"\belief that maximum communication will achieve 
maximum understanding. Through such understanding, "what 
to do" makes itself apparent. This no-method is derived 
from Husserl's phenomenology. 
Accomodating existentialism within psychology is 
very much dependent on making psychology a human 
science, whether or not psychologists are willing to 
accept the loss of their ideal of wholly rigorous 
J 
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empirical science. Interest in existentialism has been 
seen by some as a retreat to ready-wade answers in tl1e 
face of difficulties encountered in the development of 
sound, scientific psychological knowledge. This, it is 
asserted, is quite incorrect. Existentialism posits no 
answers. It claims, quite reasonably, that a science of 
humans needs to take into account the special 
characteristics of humans as they experience them, and 
that the methods of the natural sciences are patently 
unable to fulfil this condition. 
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Povper r ;_; u w (, , 1 t s f o r 
ind ter .aini SH, 1·1hic h rq _ ,e frow corni,wn nse obse vations 
or1udl, lo 6 .LciJ1 typ • Jie uot B that 
a~:-lt::·c:.ct:iuu Llrnt th,:) world :Lnlicrently 
<leLt,;:(HlilliL;tic L.J more Ucmally r f]c:,ctiou of the 
de t c~ 1· 1,1 i n is tic nu t u .re of t 1 t or i e :3 t l 1 :,1. ll a t r u reflection 
o[ tl1e 1rnr ld. 
ciiu.J.ucter oi a its 
1jri1i1.21 faci,l <let,.: titinist.ic tliuor.Les are 
c o ,up a r ,:J. t i v e 1 y e u ,3 i 1 y 
wad 1nor and 1,w p:r ci .11 (1) 
·r be S \~ ab O V e 
preferred, <lue to their Vef"J n tur of being testable. 
llowever, i t ,;; e e 1u s n o 1(1 o :c j u s t i f i b 1 Lo infer 
£:cow thelr succe s that tl12 '-NtHld hcu:: an iutrin:dcally 
Jt,:::rwinistic character tlian to in[::!r t t ti1 ,1orld ]. "' .0 
i 11 t r ins i cu 11 y :::., i 1u J? l e 11 
All prediction ta.s 
sih1plifyiug wo<lel. Thi model defines certa.:Ln 
p ;;, r a iii et er::: , t e 11 in g u 3 w ha t to :L JI c 1 u t1 e and v1 hat to l en v e 
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out of our calculations. Therefore, no prediction task 
involves all conceivable states of the world. One could 
imagine such a state of affairs (see below), but in 
practice we make use of the simplifying model. 
According to Popper, any scientific determinism 
entails the pribciple of accountability, and that" we 
ha'Ve no fea~ori tb b~lieve ih "sc:i.ent:i.f:i.c 11 dei:etrlliri0 i~1~ if 
ac«::OUl'.lt~~i}~_ty .J.~ __ µni_VBI"Sally satis.fied .. " {2) -
Popper out.lines the princ:l.pi~ ~£ ~c~~u~~ability in 
the following way: "Thus any satisfactory definition of 
"scientific" determinism will have to be based on the 
principle of accountability, that we can calculate from 
our prediction task (in conjunction with our theories of 
course) the requisite degree of precision of the initial 
conditions." (3) 
Scientific determinism necessitates that we should 
be able to work out the necessary "degree of precision 
of our initial information that is needed to carry out 
the prediction task." (4) 
Popper readily concedes that prediction of 
behaviour is to some extent possible. He also notes, 
however, that such behaviour is either goal-directed or 
tricks of habit. Also, such predictions lack precision. 
Popper admits that he can generally predict, from 
observation, when his cat will leap onto his writing 
desk, but he is sometimes wrong. And even when he is 
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correct, he has only succeeded in predicting a very 
general piece of behaviour. The cat may land some way 
from where he predicted it would. More knowledge of 
relevant initial conditions may improve his predictions, 
but as he adds: "We simply do not know what of 
initial conditions may be relevant to the prediction 
task of reducing (the error), It is not only that we 
have no theory of behaviour which satisfies the 
principle of accountability ••• up to now we have not 
even an idea where to look for such a theory." (5) 
The claim that such data may be derived from 
research into brain-states amounts to giving up the 
argument of the predictability of behaviour, since the 
argument then becomes a matter of whether or not 
physiology or physics ere deterministic. 
To accurately predict the future state of a system 
bas d on perfect knowledge of laws and conditions 
amounts to a prediction oft future growth of our own 
knowldege. Popper shows th t such self-prediction is not 
possible. "Assuming we are furnished with perfect 
theoretical knowledge, and present or past initial 
conditions, could we predict, by deductive methods, our 
own future state, for any given instant of time, and 
more es ciu~llt~ our own future predictions?" (6) 
Once we have the requisite theory and data 
regarding conditions, the prediction task becomes a 
1'.:ll 
of c ,J l c u 1 u i. o 1 1 o n l y * pruuf (" .1.: 0 J~ the 
f .[1 r c1 c L :i o n i ; : 
c lc111 tur 0 1' d ·i · L ur C JI ,l d1,ct:tvely 
tl1 r t:l ,: of :i ( /:.: 0 t1).l IJ r c~ d .J c :i o n f! or 
C ,, l Cu] Pop11cr d.ictor -- - .1 <.J. ! I lJ_ 
(1) TI1 1 · (' c or l I :, 1 vr us 1· ri \' t ii 
cor ct ep1y; 
(2,) 1ir dict.o t ,, ti11, 0 C ry <) ut J tr: 
op(;r{1tion~3 !ii 
I' l' () I I ( 1) ( '1. '; \'i,{/ L) i t. J. '.J jJ I' 0 C of 
] F _,_ 1_,1 r cl i c L j_ u 1 · l th t>:i y cr,;i r,nly CO ,:Ip J C t t~ 
ic tr, i.. L: n t t: li 1'.r() tirnc~ 
t 0 uLJj point t h~1 t th 
c:n.1 ot ii (': i Ct t ]1 f ut1.1r Ls 01.-ifn 
0\·11 {I !i ( 7) \ 
(I (' i c tor ,.,, i 11 
co plet l v ·- J [I l ,.,. i' l. L o more 
u rd :i t l, d::ic 
( 3) ·11:l s i l.l (i L,y the 
pr dictor, Iy i 11 L u c: Lirne thE1.n 
t hor r o 
1\l l 1 ,, 1.1 by t Ii clescrilJr:: 
t b tn t C' f cJ o :11 '-' p h y :3 i c l c' p l :i c i t 1 y i 11 o n c~ a n d 
t)i ~ ., t.,\ rd coll I) 1 ti 
the:·ory an.d conditions f: 0.L a1,101-1nt,3 in fuct to 
If :i t is to pre d :i ct w h n t sys t e 111 .:~ Hi 11 c1 o cl. t 
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such and such a time, it" ... cannot predict its own 
future growth of knowledge, for its completed reply will 
come too late to be a prediction, since it can arise, at 
best, only together with the event predicted." (8) 
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